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his is Old Dominion University’s 16th annual State of the Region report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to 
the university, the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, or its president, John R. Broderick. The report maintains the goal of 
stimulating thought and discussion that ultimately will make Hampton Roads an even better place to live. We are proud of our region’s many successes, 
but realize that it is possible to improve our performance. In order to do so, we must have accurate information about “where we are” and a sound 
understanding of the policy options open to us.
The 2015 report is divided into seven parts:
Running in Place? Our “So-So” Regional Economy: 2015 has been 
another “Goldilocks” year – not too hot, not too cold – economically speaking. 
We grew faster than the rest of Virginia, but slower than the U.S. It appears 
that 2016 will reprise this scenario.
Defense Expenditures in Hampton Roads: Digging Deeper: 
While defense expenditures are decelerating, in FY 2015, Newport News 
(dominated by Huntington Ingalls) received $1.13 billion in new defense 
contract awards, while Virginia Beach received $838 million, Norfolk $774 
million and Hampton $166 million. Atlantic Diving, headquartered in Virginia 
Beach, was our second-largest contractor with $206 million.
The Port of Virginia: A Primer: The economic importance of the Port 
of Virginia has increased as it is handling record cargo volumes and now is 
recording positive net operating income. The Port is challenged to find ways to 
deal effectively with congestion and logistical problems in and around the Port 
as well as to secure the funds necessary to modernize its infrastructure and 
equipment.
The Third Economic Sector: Nonprofit Organizations in Hampton 
Roads and the United Way: A total of 2,009 nonprofit organizations in 
Hampton Roads filed tax returns with the IRS in 2012. This does not include 
most churches. Collectively, these organizations are big business: their 
revenues approached $9.6 billion. 
Early Childhood Care and Education: Should They Be Our No. 1 
Economic Development Strategy? Investments in early childhood care 
and preschool programs generate higher rates of return on public dollars than 
investments in conventional economic development programs that emphasize 
either attracting new firms, or public-private partnerships to build arenas and 
hotels.
Is Hampton Roads Facing a Shortage of Nurses? Our region does 
not face a debilitating shortage of nurses. With a few tweaks to our policies, 
we will have a sufficient number of nurses to meet our needs in the years to 
come.
The Economics of Casino Gambling in Hampton Roads: The 
experience of other cities tells us that casino gambling would not have a large 
economic effect upon Hampton Roads. Further, casino gambling brings with it 
a variety of other costs that must be considered. The net effect may be close to 
zero.
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The Strome College of Business and the university continue to provide support for this report. However, it would not appear without the vital backing of the private 
donors whose names appear below. They believe in Hampton Roads and the power of rational discussion to improve our circumstances, but are not responsible for 
the views expressed in the report.
The Aimee and Frank Batten Jr. Foundation Edward L. Hamm Jr. 
Jane Batten Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce 
R. Bruce Bradley Thomas Lyons 
Ramon W. Breeden Jr. Patricia W. and J. Douglas Perry 
Arthur A. Diamonstein Anne B. Shumadine 
George Dragas Jr. 
The following individuals were instrumental in the writing, editing, design and dissemination of the report:
Vinod Agarwal Chip Filer Wolfgang Mairinger Douglas M. Walker
Barbara Blake-Gonzalez Tim Komarek Alice McAdory Luke Watson
Chris Colburn Feng Lian Katrina Miller-Stevens Shara Weber
Vicky Curtis Sharon Lomax Janet Molinaro 
Steve Daniel Cheng Luo Gary Wagner 
All 16 of the State of the Region reports are available at www.stateoftheregionreport.com, www.odu.edu/forecasting and www.jamesvkoch.com. Interact with us 
on Twitter at SOR Hampton Roads @StateofRegion and on Facebook at facebook.com/stateoftheregion. If you have comments or suggestions, please direct them to 
James V. Koch at jkoch@odu.edu, or 757-683-3458. Individual copies may be purchased for $25.  
Sincerely,
James V. Koch
Board of Visitors Professor of Economics 
and President Emeritus
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RUNNING IN PLACE? OUR “SO-SO” REGIONAL ECONOMY
I
n 2014, the real, inflation-adjusted growth rate of the Hampton Roads economy was 1.34 percent. Perhaps we should be grateful. This was higher than our 
annual regional rate of growth in five out of the past six years. As Table 1 discloses, twice during the 2008-14 time period we experienced negative growth 
rates and in only one year was our growth rate close to 2 percent.  
Nevertheless, Table 1 (and Graph 1) clearly reveals that we’ve known much 
better times. Between 2000 and 2007, for example, our regional growth 
rate never fell below 2.6 percent and in one year (2003) was a magnificent 
5.46 percent.  
Our prediction for 2015 is a 1.27 percent growth rate for the economy in 
Hampton Roads, which we believe will be below both the national growth 
rate and that of Virginia (which we estimate to be 1.56 percent). By the 
end of 2015, our nominal gross regional product (GRP) will have grown to 
$92.84 billion, a considerable number. If Hampton Roads were a separate 
country, we would have the 60th-largest economy in the world.   
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED HAMPTON ROADS GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT 










2000 50.35 61.49 4.64
2001 53.35 63.70 3.60
2002 56.66 66.63 4.59
2003 60.95 70.27 5.46
2004 65.14 73.09 4.01
2005 69.88 75.96 3.93
2006 74.27 78.34 3.12
2007 78.24 80.38 2.60
2008 79.48 80.08 -0.36
2009 80.96 80.96 1.10
2010 82.24 81.25 0.36
2011 83.74 81.06 -0.24
2012 86.89 82.62 1.93
2013 88.57 82.98 0.44
2014 91.09 84.09 1.34
2015 92.84 85.17 1.27
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data incorporate U.S. Department 
of Commerce personal income revisions through September 2014. Base year is 2009. Real GRP is 
calculated using the GDP price deflator.
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GRAPH 1
RATE OF GROWTH OF GDP (U.S.) AND GRP (HAMPTON ROADS), 2000-2015
    RATE OF GROWTH OF GDP (U.S.) AND GRP (HAMPTON ROADS): 2000-2015 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data on GDP incorporates latest BEA revisions in September 2014. 






















Percent change real GDP 
Percent change real GRP U.S. 
GRAPH 1 
Hampton Roads 
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Income Growth
As Graph 2 discloses, growth in median household income – 50th percentile 
household income – has stalled in Hampton Roads and actually was lower 
in 2014 than in 2008. This roughly mirrors national results, though the 
median household income of all Americans has edged upward slightly in 
recent years.  
Median household income is a concept that frequently is used as an overall 
measure of economic welfare even though it has some deficiencies. Let’s 
examine several of these problems. First, it is not adjusted for the cost of 
living. If it were, then we would see that “real” median household income 
has declined nearly everywhere since 2008.  
Second, median household income doesn’t control for the fact that the 
average size of households has declined significantly in recent decades. In 
1967, the average size of an American household was 3.28; by 2013, it 
had fallen to 2.54 (Carpe Diem Blog, Feb. 4, 2015). Smaller households 
result in a smaller number of individuals earning income, and this exerts a 
downward influence on median household income.
Third, median household income does not include either the value of 
employee fringe benefits (which have become an increasingly important 
aspect of compensation) or the value of supplements such as SNAP, the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps), and TANF, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
Fourth, median household income does not always reflect the increased 
quality of the goods and services that households are consuming. Personal 
computers and cellphones provide an apt illustration. The quality and power 
of these items have skyrocketed in recent years even while their prices have 
fallen dramatically. A dollar spent on similar items in 2015 provides much 
more value to a household than it did 10 years ago. Median household 
income ignores this.
These omissions mean that median household income, despite its popularity 
as a concept, is a less than perfect measure of the economic prosperity 
of the American household. Even so, despite its imperfections, median 
household income does provide us with valuable information, and by 
consensus economists frequently utilize it as a measure of the economic 
welfare of the typical household. This has led to the conclusion that the 
economic welfare of the typical household has not increased very much (and 
may have declined) in recent years. Hampton Roads does not constitute an 
exception in this regard.
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GRAPH 2
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME: HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1998-2014





























































U.S. Hampton Roads 
Comparison of Median Household Income: 
   Hampton Roads and the U.S. 1998-2014 
       Figure 2 
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Jobs
Graph 3 tells us that our national economic recovery from the 2007-09 
recession was slow indeed – it took more than six years (76 months) to 
recover all of the jobs lost. Graph 4, which focuses on Hampton Roads, 
reveals that our region has yet to recover all of the jobs it lost in the Great 
Recession. We’re still about 22,000 jobs short of gaining back the jobs that 
went away (see Graph 5).  
Virginia’s economic recovery, while better than that of Hampton Roads in 
terms of jobs, has not been robust. The Commonwealth has generated only 
29,700 additional jobs over and above its pre-recession level. Northern 
Virginia, however, is above its pre-recession peak by more than 75,000 
jobs. Richmond has gained back the jobs it lost. Hence, it is the vast area 
of Virginia outside the Urban Crescent (the “Rural Horseshoe”) that has 
sustained outsized job losses.  
Graph 6 describes in broad terms the occupations that have gained or lost 
jobs since 2007. The health care/social assistance sector added more jobs 
than all of the other sectors combined, while construction shed the most jobs 
over this time period. It is interesting to note that since 2007, public-sector 
employers in Hampton Roads (federal, state and local) have regained all 
of the jobs they shed in the Great Recession; however, private-sector job 
growth has lagged and therefore is responsible for the overall decline in the 
number of jobs in our region.
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GRAPH 3
COMPARING THE GREAT RECESSION TO OTHERS: JOB RECOVERY IN THE U.S.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
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GRAPH 4
RECESSION RECOVERY IN THE U.S., VIRGINIA AND HAMPTON ROADS MEASURED BY TOTAL JOBS RESTORED, 2007-2015*
 Recession Recovery in the U.S,. Virginia and Hampton Roads 
Measured by Total Jobs Restored, 2007-2015* 
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Hampton Roads: July 2007 
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GRAPH 5
ANNUAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT (JOBS) IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1999-2015






















Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES data and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data are not seasonally adjusted.  
The Hampton Roads economy 
created only 1,100 jobs in 2014. 
At the end of December 2014, we 
were still about 22,000 jobs below 
our pre-recession level. 
       Figure 5 
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 201512
GRAPH 6
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Defense Spending
Between 2000 and 2012, direct Department of Defense (DOD) spending 
in Hampton Roads increased by an average of 5.6 percent annually. This 
provided a powerful economic thrust for our region. Unfortunately, 
times have changed and we expect DOD spending in Hampton 
Roads in 2015 to be 3.2 percent below the peak we observed 
in 2012. Graph 7, which depicts these changes, offers a powerful visual 
explanation of how the growth of our regional economy has slowed.
The upshot of declining DOD spending is that it has forcibly 
diversified the Hampton Roads economy. We estimate that 
only 40.3 percent of our regional economic activity could 
be attributed directly and indirectly to defense spending in 
2014 (see Graph 8). This is down from 44.9 percent in 2011 
and our all-time high of 49.5 percent in 1984. Thus, we have 
diversified our economy, but not as the result of strong private-
sector growth. Instead, the reason is declining DOD spending.
It has been our fate as a region to experience periodic ups and downs in 
DOD spending. Currently, DOD spending is contracting and our estimate 
is that it will account for only about 39 percent of our regional economic 
activity in 2015. A major driver of this change is the evolution that has 
occurred in the compensation of active-duty military personnel, civilian DOD 
personnel and federal government employees. Each of these employee 
segments is critically important to the economy of Hampton Roads. Table 
2 reveals that total active-duty military compensation (wages plus all fringe 
benefits, including housing) grew 61.6 percent in our region during the past 
decade, but actually declined by 6.9 percent between 2010 and 2013. 
This reflects both a decline in the number of such individuals posted in our 
region and the much more moderate increases in the compensation of these 
individuals. 
The bottom line, economically speaking, is that our region has lost one of its 
major growth engines – we no longer enjoy rising total military and federal 
employee compensation. Indeed, Table 3 examines average compensation 
per employee and it is apparent that a change in the mix of military and 
federal employees in our region has led to lower average compensation per 
employee as well.
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GRAPH 7
ESTIMATED DIRECT DOD SPENDING* IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2015
Estimated Direct DOD Spending in Hampton Roads: 2000 to 2015 


















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Between 2000 and 2012, DOD spending in our region 
increased by an average of 5.6%  annually. In 2015, it 
will be about 3.2% lower than its peak in 2012. 
Figure 7 
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GRAPH 8
HAMPTON ROADS GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT ATTRIBUTABLE TO DOD SPENDING, 1984-2015
Hampton Roads Gross Regional Product Attributable to DOD Spending: 1984-2015 
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TABLE 2
GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT AND TOTAL COMPENSATION* (WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR 
MILITARY, FEDERAL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE NONFARM SECTORS, HAMPTON ROADS, 









Military Employment -21.3% -13.6% -9.2% -2.2%
Military Compensation 5.9% 61.6% -6.9% -4.7%
Federal Civilian Government 
Employment
-20.6% 13.3% 1.1% -1.6%
Federal Civilian Government 
Compensation
11.0% 68.6% 4.2% -2.3%
Private Nonfarm Employment 22.3% 5.3% 3.3% 1.5%
Private Nonfarm 
Compensation
69.3% 36.4% 9.3% 2.7%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *BEA calls compensation as earnings.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED AVERAGE COMPENSATION* (WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) 
FOR SELECTED CATEGORIES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001, 2012 AND 2013







Military $47,077 $92,741 $90,364 87.1% 2.6% -2.6%
Federal Civilian 
Govt. Employees
$63,631 $98,299 $97,596 48.8% 3.1% -0.7%
State and Local 
Govt. Employees
$40,251 $55,406 $56,067 37.1% 1.6% 1.2%
Private Nonfarm $29,415 $39,860 $40,330 29.6% 5.8% 1.2%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *BEA calls compensation as earnings.
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SEQUESTRATION
If it can be said that there exists a public “dirty word” in the economic 
lexicon of Hampton Roads, then that word probably is “sequestration.” The 
sequestration process approved by the U.S. Congress a few years back 
sequestered (removed) funds that otherwise would have been spent by the 
federal government on a wide range of activities, including defense.  
Graph 9 illustrates the impact of sequestration on DOD discretionary 
spending. This is DOD spending that is separate from most expenditures 
made as a part of special operations, such as those in the Middle East 
and Afghanistan. The blue line indicates what DOD spending would have 
been without any sequestration reductions. The red line depicts the level 
of DOD spending after the sequestration (reduction) agreement. The total 
sequestration reduction in DOD spending amounted to $483 billion through 
the federal government’s FY 2012 year. 
The green line in Graph 9 represents sequestration relief ($31.6 billion 
in restored spending) that was agreed to by Congress for FY 2014 and 
FY 2015. The area of the purple trapezoid reflects this $31.6 billion 
restoration, which will disappear in FY 2016 unless Congress comes to an 
agreement to maintain such spending.  
If sequestration continues, then the “cap” it places on discretionary DOD 
spending will increase slightly to $523.1 billion in FY 2016 – only 0.35 
percent. This is a recipe for continuing economic stagnancy in Hampton 
Roads, even though most of the proposed cuts will focus on the U.S. Army 
and U.S. Air Force.  
A portion of the decline in DOD spending in Hampton Roads 
relates specifically to a significant reduction in the number 
active-duty military personnel posted in our region. Since the 
turn of the century, this number peaked at 113,400 in 2003 
and declined every year since then to 86,500 in 2013 (see 
Graph 10). There are several reasons for this:
•  Stagnant or declining DOD expenditures in Hampton Roads, coupled 
with higher compensation rates, necessarily translates to a need for fewer 
people.
•  The increasing cost of major assets and equipment (such as aircraft 
carriers and airplanes) means that the DOD cannot purchase as many 
of these items. Fewer ships and planes also result in the need for fewer 
people.
•  A refocusing of the defense posture of the United States away from the 
Atlantic and toward the Pacific Rim has drained personnel from our 
region.  
The DOD budgetary picture for Hampton Roads is not 
completely bleak, however. There is some good news for 2015 
and beyond. Congress stated its intention to maintain 11 large aircraft 
carriers in the fleet; continued funding for construction of the Gerald R. Ford 
and for refueling and overhaul of the George Washington; rejected requests 
to close bases; provided funding for two Virginia-class submarines in 2015; 
limited the number of guided missile cruisers that can be deactivated; 
provided $190 million in funding for DOD construction projects for Hampton 
Roads; and provided a 1 percent pay raise for most military and civilian 
government employees. In June 2015, the DOD announced that Huntington 
Ingalls had been awarded a $3.35 billion contract for the design and 
construction of new aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy.  
Each of these developments will preserve employment in our region. 
Given our continued dependence on DOD spending, it is appropriate to 
observe that things could have been much worse for Hampton Roads where 
sequestration is concerned.
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GRAPH 9


















BCA 2011 Sequestration BBA 2013 
Caps on Department of Defense Discretionary Spending, FY 2012 to FY 2021 
Sources: Budget Control Act 2011, budget requests for FY14, Congressional Budget Office Sequestration Update Report and 
the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
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GRAPH 10
MILITARY EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2013
MILITARY EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS: 2001-2013 























































By 2013, military employment had declined 23.7% from its 2003 peak. 
GRAPH 10 
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Comparing Hampton Roads 
To Others
We’ve already seen that Hampton Roads has yet to recover all of the jobs 
that it lost in the Great Recession. How do we compare to other Atlantic 
Coast metropolitan regions in this regard? The answer, as one can see 
in Table 4, is “not so well.” Regions such as Charlotte and Raleigh have 
absolutely left Hampton Roads in their dust insofar as job creation is 
concerned. Between 2007 and 2014, while we lost 21,800 jobs, Charlotte 
gained 42,700 jobs and Raleigh augmented 37,400 jobs. If we back up 
to 2004 to include times that were more attractive for Hampton Roads, 
the growth in our total regional jobs was only 0.46 percent, well below 
Virginia’s 5.2 percent or the country’s 5.54 percent.  
Even though Hampton Roads has not been creating many new jobs, our 
rate of unemployment has been falling and is well below the U.S. average. 
Graph 11 compares our unemployment rates to those of the United States 
since 2000 and it is apparent we have consistently reported a lower rate of 
unemployment than the nation as a whole.  
How can this be? Part of the answer is lower labor force participation in our 
region. One is not counted as unemployed if one either is employed or has 
stopped actively looking for a job. We appear to have a large proportion of 
people who fall into this latter category. One collateral piece of supporting 
evidence is provided in Graph 12, which reveals a significant decline in the 
number of individuals applying for unemployment benefits. One has to be 
seeking a job in order to claim unemployment benefits.
We do not have the space here to address the falling labor force 
participation rate issue in detail; however, this “drop out of the labor 
force” phenomenon cannot be seen as good news for our region. It results 
in sharply diminished economic prospects for the individuals who have 
“dropped out” and also generates increased social costs relating to welfare 
payments and criminal activity.  
TABLE 4
COMPARING CIVILIAN JOB GAINS AND LOSSES IN 
HAMPTON ROADS TO OTHER REGIONS, VIRGINIA AND THE 
U.S., 2004-2014 (IN THOUSANDS)
Area 2004-07 2007-14
2004-14 Change 
and Percent of Total
Hampton Roads 25.2 -21.8 3.4 (0.46%)
Charlotte 98.2 42.7 140.9 (15.26%)
Durham* 24.9 8.4 33.3 (12.93%)
Jacksonville 55.2 -8.2 47.0 (8.16%)
Raleigh* 73.2 37.4 110.6        (24.63%)
Richmond 28.9 8.3 37.2          (6.26%)
U.S. 6,187.7 1,105.9 7,293.6        (5.54%)
Virginia* 184.0 2.7 186.7       (5.20%)
North Carolina 307.4 0.7 308.1       (8.04%)
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES seasonally unadjusted data and the Old Dominion University 
Economic Forecasting Project. *Peak employment in Durham, Raleigh and Virginia occurred in 2008.  
Changes for these areas are shown for 2004 through 2008 and 2008 through 2014.  
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GRAPH 11


























































Hampton Roads U.S. 
Figure 11 
Hampton Roads and U.S. Unemployment Rates, 2000-2015 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data are not seasonally adjusted. Revised data April 18, 2014.  
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GRAPH 12
MONTHLY INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS FOR HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2004 THROUGH JULY 2015 
(12-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE)
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Old Dominion University Forecasting Project  
MONTHLY INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS FOR HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2004 THROUGH  JULY 2015 
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Currently: 3,995 
High: 7,449 (May 2010) 
Low: 3,974 (Dec. 2007) 
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Comparing Our Major Cities
The economies of some of our cities are growing, while others have been 
stagnant or even contracting. Graph 13 reports the growth in “real” (after 
inflation has been considered) nonfarm earnings of each of our largest 
seven cities between 2001 and 2013. All of the cities’ growth rates are 
indexed to 1.00 in 2001. One can see that Suffolk, energized by 
considerable population growth, experienced a 63 percent 
increase in its total, after inflation, nonfarm income between 
2001 and 2013. A bit more surprising, perhaps, is the 
performance of Portsmouth, which recorded a 40 percent 
increase during the same period. Prior to the imposition of 
tolls, Portsmouth’s economic base was growing rather nicely.
In general, total incomes in western Hampton Roads cities grew faster than 
those in eastern Hampton Roads and on the Peninsula since the turn of the 
century.
Graph 14 abbreviates the window of comparison to 2009 to 2013. 
Suffolk remains in first place, but now is followed by Newport News and 
Portsmouth. Note that total, after inflation, nonfarm incomes earned in 
Norfolk and Hampton actually declined – and not by a little bit, either. 
Norfolk’s decline was about 6 percent and Hampton’s about 8 percent. 
In real terms, these two cities’ economies have contracted since the Great 
Recession.
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GRAPH 13
INDEXED NONFARM EARNINGS, LARGEST CITIES, CONSTANT DOLLARS, 2001-2013
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GRAPH 14
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Figure 14 
   Indexed Non-farm Earnings,  
   Largest Largest Cities, Constant Dollars, 2009-2013 
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Tourism And Hotels
In 2014, total hotel revenues in Hampton Roads still had not recovered to 
the record $714.4 million level our region recorded in 2007 (see Graph 
15). We may finally surpass the 2007 level in 2015.  
While the recovery of our travel and tourism industry from the Great 
Recession has been sluggish, there have been important underlying changes 
occurring in that market. Graph 16 reports that the Historic Triangle 
(Williamsburg) has lost significant tourism market share since 1999. One of 
the major beneficiaries has been Virginia Beach, which now claims 41.3 
percent of the overall regional travel and tourism market.  
Experienced analysts prefer an alternative measure of the 
health of the travel and tourism market – REVPAR – because 
it takes into account both the supply and demand sides of the 
market. REVPAR stands for revenue per available room and 
measures the average number of dollars earned per available 
room on the market. Table 5 discloses that REVPAR rose 13.3 
percent in the United States between 2007 and 2014, but fell 
by 6.8 percent in Hampton Roads, 12.2 percent in Norfolk/
Portsmouth, 16.2 percent in Williamsburg and 17.2 percent in 
Chesapeake/Suffolk during the same time period.
Lower demand for hotel and motel rooms explains the Norfolk/Portsmouth 
and Williamsburg numbers, but not those for Chesapeake/Suffolk. Neither 
Norfolk/Portsmouth nor Williamsburg added many new hotel and motel 
rooms and therefore their REVPAR declines represent a decrease in the 
demand for their properties. In the case of Chesapeake/Suffolk, however, 
the story is different. As Graph 17 reveals, the number of occupied hotel 
and motel rooms in those two cities increased noticeably in recent years, 
but not nearly as fast as the supply of rooms, which ballooned from 1,405 
in 2007 to 1,986 in 2014. Simply put, there was overbuilding of hotel 
and motel capacity in Chesapeake/Suffolk. These cities likely will be 
able to grow out of this problem, though it may take the remainder of this 
decade for them to do so. It is doubtful that either Williamsburg or Norfolk/
Portsmouth can count on this occurring.  
All things considered, it is not an auspicious time to be adding new hotels 
and motels. The single exception to this dictum may be Virginia Beach 
because of the gradually growing demand for tourism there.
TABLE 5




U.S. $65.54 $74.28 +13.3%
Virginia $61.95 $59.42 -4.1%
Hampton Roads $52.90 $49.30 -6.8%
Myrtle Beach $54.07 $64.12 +  18.7%
Coastal Carolina $55.83 $61.22 + 9.7%
Ocean City $71.74 $72.38 +0.9%




Norfolk/Portsmouth $54.05 $47.48 -12.2%
Williamsburg $47.53 $39.81 -16.2%
Chesapeake/Suffolk $52.90 $43.78 - 17.2%
Source: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, Jan. 21, 2015, and the Old Dominion University Economic 
Forecasting Project  
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GRAPH 15
HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1996-2015





































































































































Hotel Revenue in Hampton Roads, 1996-2015 
Figure 15 
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GRAPH 16


























Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, Jan. 21, 2015, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Estimated City Hotel Market Shares in Hampton Roads   
as Indicated by Industry Revenues, 1999 and 2014  
Figure 16 
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Available Occupied Linear (Available) Linear (Occupied) 
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, Jan. 21, 2015, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project   
Hotel Room Nights in Chesapeake/Suffolk Market, 1999-2014 
Figure 17 
-
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Residential Housing
After a 90 percent increase in the median sales price of existing residential 
homes between 2002 and 2007, house prices declined by 19 percent 
between 2007 and 2011. Since then, there has been modest recovery, 
but the 2015 median sales price still is likely to be more than 
$20,000 below the $223,000 peak attained in 2007. Table 6 
supplies these data.
Pricewise, the nadir of the local residential housing market occurred in 
2011. Since then, there have been improvements. Graph 18 shows both 
a declining average number of days an existing home was on the market 
before selling and an increasing total number of sales in Hampton Roads 
since 2011. Additionally, one can see in Graph 19 that residential housing 
foreclosures continue to wane and in Graph 20 that active listings of 
distressed homes – those that either are REO (bank owned) or short sales, 
continue to decline. However, REO sales and short sales together 
still accounted for 21.9 percent of all existing home sales in 
Hampton Roads in 2014.  
The impact of REO and short sales on housing prices is almost 
uniformly negative. The median prices of REO existing home 
sales was only 49.5 percent of the median price of non-
distressed sales in 2014, while the median price of short sale 
homes was 71.3 percent of the median price of non-distressed 
sales (see Table 7).
These changes noted, the improvements that have occurred in the Hampton 
Roads housing market have not been vast. This is a market that 
continues to limp toward recovery and, if anything, that 
recovery slowed a bit in 2014.
The good news on the housing front is that homes in our region certainly 
are more affordable now than during the middle of the previous decade. 
In Table 8 we compute the average mortgage payment that an individual 
would have to make if he or she purchased a median-priced existing home, 
paid 1 percent in real estate taxes and had a prevailing 30-year mortgage 
on the entire value of their home for each year. Note that the average 
mortgage rate for 2014 was 4.17 percent as opposed to 6.34 percent in 
2007. 
Meanwhile, the median monthly rent for a three-bedroom apartment 
in Hampton Roads has increased significantly since 2007, reflecting a 
tightening supply-and-demand situation for rental housing in our region. 
Table 8 reveals that the median monthly rent for a three-bedroom apartment 
in 2014 was $1,562, which was $438 per month more than the 
representative mortgage payment per month. A home purchase, then, was 
a superior choice versus renting for those whose credit and financial means 
enabled them to purchase a home.  
Graph 21 expresses housing affordability in terms of the percentage of 
the median household income in our region that would be required if one 
were to purchase a home. Viewed historically, buying a home in 
Hampton Roads now is almost as affordable as it has been for 
nearly 40 years.
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TABLE 6



















Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting 






THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 201532
TABLE 7










REO Price % 
Non-Distressed 
Sales
2006 $214,900 $230,000 107.0 $ 82,500 38.4
2007 $224,000 $239,950 107.1 $140,000 62.5
2008 $220,000 $215,000 97.7 $160,500 73.0
2009 $215,000 $215,000 100.0 $150,000 69.8
2010 $220,000 $208,000 94.6 $133,000 60.5
2011 $205,000 $190,000 92.7 $115,000 56.1
2012 $208,000 $167,250 80.4 $110,000 52.9
2013 $213,000 $160,000 75.1 $109,625 51.5
2014 $214,000 $152,580 71.3 $106,000 49.5
2015* $221,450 $152,950 69.1 $110,000 51.9
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Information deemed reliable but not guaranteed. REOs represent bank-owned homes. *Data for 2015 are through 
July 2015.
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TABLE 8
ESTIMATED APARTMENT RENTAL AND PRINCIPAL, INTEREST AND TAXES FOR A HOUSE PAYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2014
Year
Median Monthly Rent for a 
Three-Bedroom Apartment
PI&T Monthly for a 
Median-Priced House
Ratio of Monthly Rent to PI&T
2001 $ 882 836 1.05
2002  911 861 1.06
2003 1,037 890 1.16
2004 1,044 1,073 0.97
2005 1 ,087 1,315 0.83
2006 1,118 1,533 0.73
2007 1,164 1,598 0.73
2008 1,247 1,507 0.83
2009 1,236 1,307 0.95
2010 1,277 1,233 1.04
2011 1,319 1,071 1.23
2012 1,454 1,015 1.43
2013 1,570 1,080 1.45
2014 1,562 1,124 1.39
Sources: HUD and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. It is assumed that the real estate tax rate is 1 percent and the tax reduction received by homeowners would compensate for homeowners’ insurance 
and maintenance expenditures. 
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GRAPH 18






























2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
14703 Average Days on Market 
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Information deemed reliable but not guaranteed. Days on market is calculated 
from the date listed to the date under contract for existing homes sold.  
Existing Residential Homes Sold and Average Days on the Market in Hampton Roads, 2000-2014 
Figure 18 
Number of Sales
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GRAPH 19
HAMPTON ROADS RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE FILINGS, 2006-2014
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GRAPH 20
NUMBER OF ACTIVE LISTINGS OF DISTRESSED HOMES (REO AND SHORT SALES) IN HAMPTON ROADS, JUNE 2008–JULY 2015
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
NUMBER OF ACTIVE LISTING OF DISTRESSED HOMES (REO & SHORT SALES)  IN HAMPTON 










July 2015: 1,659 
Peak: 3,224 (November 2010) 
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GRAPH 21
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR A MEDIAN-PRICED RESALE HOUSE AS A PERCENTAGE OF 














































































U.S. Hampton Roads 
Source: The Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (assumes a 30-year mortgage rate of 4.17 percent for 2014) 
Housing Affordability:   Monthly Payment  for a Median Price Resale House as a Percent of Median 
Household Monthly Income in  Hampton Roads and the U.S., 1979 to 2014 
Figure 21 
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (assumes a 30-year mortgage rate of 4.17 percent for 2014)
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Summing It Up
Tables 9 and 10 summarize where we were in June 2014 compared to 
June 2015, economically speaking. Except for employment and the labor 
market, the percentage changes are notably positive. In general, we’re 
better off now than we were last year at this time. For example, automobile 
registrations are up 7.43 percent over the previous year and the value of 
single-unit new housing permits is up 20.27 percent over 2014.  
The problem child of the regional economy continues to be employment and 
job markets. The size of our labor force actually has declined marginally 
in recent months, as has total employment. Yes, our unemployment rate 
continues to decline, but we’ve noted that declining labor force participation 
seems to be an important cause.  
The Port of Virginia continues to be a bright spot for our region and 
therefore we devote a complete chapter to it later in this report. We also 
zero in on the impact of changing defense spending on particular segments 
of our regional economy.
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TABLE 9
REGIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE THROUGH JUNE 2014 AND JUNE 2015: JOBS AND SALES
YTD June 2014 YTD June 2015 % Change
Civilian Labor Force 845,946 840,195 -0.68
Employment 796,498 794,700 -0.23
Unemployment 49,448 45,495 -7.99
Unemployment Rate 5.85% 5.41% N/A
Civilian Nonfarm Jobs* 750,171 756,086 +0.79
Number of Jobs Added Since 
Previous December*
300 4,200 N/A
New Auto Registrations* 47,636 51,176 +7.43
Taxable Sales $10.06B $10.43B +3.72
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Data shown here are for YTD July 2014 and YTD July 2015.
TABLE 10
REGIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE THROUGH JUNE 2014 AND JUNE 2015: HOTELS, PORT AND HOUSING
YTD June 2014 YTD June 2015 % Change
Hotel Revenue* $414.88M $437.22M +5.39
General Cargo Tonnage* 10.83M 11.99M +10.71
TEU Containers* 1,344,425 1,479,704 +10.06
Number of 1-Unit Housing Permits 1,913 2,208 +15.42
Value of 1-Unit Housing Permits $393.31M $473.05M +20.27
Number of Existing Homes Sold* 10,628 11,885 +11.83
Distressed Homes as a Percentage of 
All Existing Homes Sold*
23.35 19.76 N/A
Median Price of Existing Homes Sold* $190,000 $203,000 +6.84
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Data shown here are for YTD July 2014 and YTD July 2015.

Defense Expenditures In 
Hampton Roads: 
Digging Deeper
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DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN HAMPTON ROADS: 
DIGGING DEEPER
W
e know that Hampton Roads is heavily dependent upon defense spending – approximately 39 percent of the value of our economic activity 
is directly or indirectly related to defense spending. This is a big number, but disguises some important information: for example, how that 
activity is distributed among the cities and counties of our region and which companies are involved. Let’s now take a closer look in order to 
supply some answers.
There are two major conduits for Department of Defense (DOD) funds 
that come to Hampton Roads: (1) expenditures made on personnel; and 
(2) expenditures made via contracts negotiated by the DOD with private 
firms or other governmental units for construction, equipment, supplies, 
services, etc. In the introductory chapter of this report, we 
examined total DOD personnel expenditures in our region 
and found that between 2010 and 2013, such expenditures 
declined by 6.9 percent. To put this number in context, total 
federal civilian expenditures on personnel increased by 4.2 
percent in Hampton Roads during the same time period, while 
comparable total private, nonfarm personnel expenditures 
increased 9.3 percent.  
DOD contracts in our region usually are less visible than personnel 
expenditures. Exceptions include the large DOD contracts with Huntington 
Ingalls relating to the construction or rehabilitation of aircraft carriers. These 
events justifiably garner lots of attention, but most other DOD contracts merit 
nothing more than a sentence in the business section of local publications.  
However, as Graph 1 discloses, these “other” contracts are significant in 
number, not the least because after they are signed, the contracts frequently 
are modified and extended. Such events, termed “transactions,” are 
commonplace. Despite their frequency and ultimate economic impact when 
considered as a whole, DOD transactions in Hampton Roads seldom capture 
the public’s attention. In any case, Virginia Beach and Norfolk record far 
more DOD transactions than any other cities or counties in our region.
The total value of the DOD procurement contracts in Hampton Roads 
only roughly mirrors the number of transactions. Graph 2 informs us 
that in FY 2015, the value of DOD contracts exceeded $1.13 
billion in Newport News, $838 million in Virginia Beach and 
$774 million in Norfolk.  
The lesson of Graph 2, however, is that virtually every city and county in 
our region has a stake in DOD contractual procurement spending. We rise 
and fall as a group when DOD spending changes. This was very good for 
us, economically speaking, in the previous decade when defense spending 
was increasing rapidly. Conditions were less salubrious for us in 2015 when 
defense spending was stagnant or declining in most categories.
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GRAPH 2















DOD Contracts Awarded by Recipient City: FY 2015 (millions of dollars) 
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Who Receives DOD Contracts 
In Hampton Roads?
Which companies and firms are receiving the DOD contracts? Graph 3 
supplies FY 2015 data for Hampton Roads. While Huntington Ingalls easily 
is the largest DOD contract recipient, not all of the $1.132 billion of activity 
noted for the company in FY 2015 actually relates to Newport News, the 
company’s headquarters. We were unable to separate Newport News from 
other locations where Huntington Ingalls contracts are concerned. 
We were, however, able to record DOD contract locations for No. 2-ranked 
Atlantic Diving Supply, which is headquartered in Virginia Beach. Atlantic 
Diving scored $206.04 million overall in DOD contracts in FY 2015, 
although only $92.62 million of these contracts could be directly connected 
to its headquarters in Virginia Beach. 
We hasten to point out that even when a DOD contract is located in a 
specific city, say Portsmouth, this does not guarantee that the money from 
the contract actually will be spent there. The money received by a firm 
headquartered in one city or county may be spent in another city or county, 
or even in another state. Further, since slightly more than 65 percent of all 
employed residents of Hampton Roads cross city or county lines when they 
commute to their jobs, DOD contractual spending tends to diffuse broadly 
across the region. For example, more than 33,000 people living in Virginia 
Beach commute into Norfolk to work each day. A significant portion of the 
incomes they earn will end up being spent in Virginia Beach rather than 
Norfolk.1  
1   Vinod Agarwal and James V. Koch, Our Job Also Is Your Job, a study conducted for the Hampton Roads 
Economic Development Alliance, 2015. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/cvn-21. 
http://historyinpieces.com/research/us-military-personnel-1954-2014.
Atlantic Diving Supply, headquartered in Virginia Beach, is 
not a name that rolls off the tongues of many residents of 
Hampton Roads.  It is, however, the second-largest defense 
contractor in our region and typically records sales exceeding 
$1 billion annually. It often acts as an intermediary between 
its customers (mostly the DOD and Homeland Security) 
and supplier of items such as boots, cold-weather and fire-
resistant clothing, water-hydration items, etc.  
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Can We Detect Any Trends?
Graph 4 illustrates the ups and downs that have occurred in DOD contracts 
awarded to firms and organizations in Hampton Roads between 2007 and 
2014 (calendar year data). The variations reflect two major influences: 
(1) the overall downward trend in total DOD spending in our region; and 
(2) the timing of large contracts at firms such as Huntington Ingalls. In 
June 2015, for example, Huntington Ingalls announced that 
it had received a $3.35 billion contract for future work on the 
detail, design and construction of the nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier John F. Kennedy (CVN 79), upon which it already was 
working. The company also received a $941 million contract 
for modifications to existing construction on the ship. Work on 
the 100,000-ton vessel began in 2011; it is scheduled to join the U.S. fleet 
in 2017.  
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN HAMPTON ROADS: DIGGING DEEPER 49
GRAPH 4
DOD CONTRACTS RECEIVED BY FIRMS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN HAMPTON ROADS, CALENDAR YEARS 2007-2014













Shipbuilding And Repair Employment 
 
The fluctuating overall levels of DOD contracts received by firms and organizations in Hampton 
Roads mask both the importance of and growth in employment that has occurred in the 
shipbuilding and repair industry (SIC 3366), as defined by the Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Contrary to expectations, such employment rose more than 26 
percent between 2005 and 2014. This directly reflects the comparatively high level of activity at 
Huntington Ingalls, which has overcome declines in ship repair contracting that have occurred at 
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Shipbuilding And Repair 
Employment
The fluctuating overall levels of DOD contracts received by firms and 
organizations in Hampton Roads mask both the importance of and growth 
in employment that has occurred in the shipbuilding and repair industry (SIC 
3366), as defined by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. Graph 5 shows that contrary to expectations, such employment 
rose more than 26 percent between 2005 and 2014. This directly reflects 
the comparatively high level of activity at Huntington Ingalls, which has 
overcome declines in ship repair contracting that have occurred at several 
major regional firms.  
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GRAPH 5
TOTAL SHIP AND BOAT BUILDING EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2005-2014





Source: www.bls.gov, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) 
 
 
The Impact Of DOD Contract Spending On Personnel 
 
The aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), which also is a Huntington Ingalls project and will 
join the fleet in 2016, will cost $13.7 billion. Its crew will number 4,500, about 1,000 fewer than 
existing carriers.2 This underscores a distinct trend in defense spending – increasingly 
expensive assets, such as aircraft carriers, translate into a reduced ability to employ and 
support personnel. The tradeoff is straightforward: As the DOD expends increasing 
proportions of its budget on expensive ships, airplanes and technology, it inevitably finds 
that it cannot hire as many people. This means that the number of active-duty military 
personnel and DOD civilian employees must decline. 
 
And, this is what has occurred. The DOD today has fewer dollars available to hire people. This is 
a motivating reason why the number of active-duty military declined from 2.04 million in 1990 
to only 1.35 million in 2014. Active-duty personnel in the U.S. Navy in 2014 were only about 
one-half the number in 1990.3 In Hampton Roads, the most recent peak in the number of 
active-duty military personnel occurred in 2003, when 113,400 individuals were deployed 
here. This number has declined every year since then, and had dropped to 86,500 in 2013. 
   
                                                
2  http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/cvn-21. 
 
3  http://historyinpieces.com/research/us-military-personnel-1954-2014. 
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The Impact Of DOD Contract 
Spending On Personnel
The aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), which also is a Huntington 
Ingalls project and will join the fleet in 2016, will cost $13.7 billion. Its 
crew will number 4,500, about 1,000 fewer than existing carriers.2 This 
underscores a distinct trend in defense spending – increasingly 
expensive assets, such as aircraft carriers, translate into a 
reduced ability to employ and support personnel. The tradeoff 
is straightforward: As the DOD expends increasing proportions 
of its budget on expensive ships, airplanes and technology, 
it inevitably finds that it cannot hire as many people. This 
means that the number of active-duty military personnel and DOD civilian 
employees must decline.
And, this is what has occurred. The DOD today has fewer dollars available 
to hire people. This is a motivating reason why the number of active-duty 
military declined from 2.04 million in 1990 to only 1.35 million in 2014. 
Active-duty personnel in the U.S. Navy in 2014 were only about one-half 
the number in 1990.3 In Hampton Roads, the most recent peak 
in the number of active-duty military personnel occurred in 
2003, when 113,400 individuals were deployed here. This 
number has declined every year since then, and had dropped 
to 86,500 in 2013.
In some cases, the deployment of technology results in smaller numbers of 
individuals being needed to accomplish necessary tasks. As already noted, 
the crew of the Gerald R. Ford will number 1,000 fewer individuals than the 
crews of predecessor aircraft carriers.  
Here is the rub for Hampton Roads. More expensive carriers 
will result in fewer active-duty personnel at Naval Station 
Norfolk. More expensive aircraft at Oceana Naval Air Station 
2 http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/cvn-21.
3 http://historyinpieces.com/research/us-military-personnel-1954-2014.
eventually will mean fewer active-duty personnel there. The 
same DOD dollar cannot be spent in two places.  
The expense-driven assets-versus-people analysis just described is 
independent of other potentially negative influences on defense spending in 
our region, which include: (1) rising DOD personnel costs, especially those 
relating to health care and pensions; (2) the refocusing of U.S. defense 
attention toward the Pacific Rim; (3) risk factors associated with homeporting 
so many carriers in a single location; (4) questions as to whether aircraft 
carriers really are the most effective defense assets to deploy in a variety 
of combustible, confined naval situations around the world; and (5) rising 
sea levels that could make Hampton Roads a comparatively less attractive 
location for the U.S. Navy.   
The F-35 fighter jet is billed as the fighter of the 
future for the United States. Each new F-35 will 
cost more than $300 million. Contrast this to the 
approximate $50,000 cost of a single P-51 Mustang, 
the state-of-the-art conventionally powered fighter 
airplane in 1945. This corresponds to about $660,000 
in current prices. More than 15,000 P-51s were built. 
Production of the much more expensive F-35 will 
number in the hundreds.
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Summing It Up
One area leader, upon reviewing the list of the largest DOD contract 
recipients provided in Graph 3, exclaimed, “I’ve never heard of half of these 
companies.” He’s not the only one. Defense contracting is very big business 
in Hampton Roads, but much of it occurs outside the public and media 
spotlights.  
While sequestration and DOD expenditure caps have adversely affected 
the volume of DOD contracting in Hampton Roads, our regional numbers 
are quite sensitive to the periodic awarding of large contracts to Huntington 
Ingalls for shipbuilding and rehabilitation. Recent contract awards ensure 
that this particular source of economic energy for Hampton Roads is not 
likely to decline dramatically in the next few years.  
The same cannot be said for DOD compensation of its active-duty personnel 
and civilian employees. It seems likely that the roster of such individuals will 
continue to decline in our region, at least partially because the prices of 
major defense assets, such as aircraft carriers, submarines and airplanes, 
continue to increase significantly. The DOD simply does not have sufficient 
funds to purchase these expensive assets and to attract and retain existing 
levels of personnel. This helps explain why the number of active-duty military 
personnel in Hampton Roads has declined more than 20 percent since 
2003.

The Port Of Virginia: 
A Primer
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THE PORT OF VIRGINIA: A PRIMER
T
he Port of Virginia (“the Port”) is the third-largest port on the East Coast and the fifth largest in the United States. In 2014 alone, 2,789 vessels called 
on the Port and more than $71 billion worth of cargo flowed through it. Like any business, activities at the Port have evolved amid changing economic 
and political conditions. To remain competitive, the Port must be nimble and adjust to changing circumstances.
Our goal in this chapter is to provide readers with a 
nontechnical primer about the Port and its prospects. We’ll deal 
with its organization, its financial situation, its current activities, the likely 
effects of future developments such as the expansion of the Panama Canal, 
and its logistical challenges.  
How The Port Is Organized
Since the early 1980s, the Port of Virginia has operated as a public-private 
partnership. In 1981, the Virginia General Assembly gave the Virginia Port 
Authority (VPA) the power to acquire and maintain Virginia port terminals. 
The intent was to place all of the Commonwealth’s maritime assets under one 
umbrella. Prior to this, several municipalities (in our region, Newport News, 
Norfolk and Portsmouth) owned the marine terminal on their shores. The 
General Assembly accurately surmised that the unification of the terminals 
would help keep the Port competitive with its East Coast rivals and stimulate 
economic growth.
The state-run VPA created Virginia International Terminals (VIT) in 1982 as 
a private, not-for-profit organization. VIT was tasked with running the daily 
operations at the Port Authority’s newly acquired terminals in Newport 
News, Norfolk and Portsmouth. Because it is a private organization, VIT is 
not subject to a variety of Virginia statutes and regulations. For example, VIT 
has the ability to contract with the International Longshoremen’s Association, 
which dominates port labor relations throughout the United States, whereas 
the Commonwealth is forbidden by statute from doing so. 
The public VPA owns or leases terminals, while the private VIT has 
historically managed operations and negotiated with customers. This type of 
management structure is not unusual. An easy majority of the world’s largest 
ports are managed and operated by private firms, the largest of which are 
Hutchison, DP World, PSA and APM Maersk.   
Until 2007, all of the major maritime container terminals in Hampton Roads 
were owned by the Commonwealth’s VPA. However, in that year, APM 
Terminals Virginia (operated by Danish business conglomerate Maersk) 
opened in Portsmouth. The APM facility utilizes state-of-the-art technology 
and was built at a cost approximating $540 million. At the time, APM 
Terminals Virginia was the largest privately owned terminal in the United 
States and was designed to accommodate larger vessels that are expected 
to come through the expanded Panama Canal.
In 2010, the VPA chose to lease the APM Terminals facility and signed 
a 20-year lease agreement with APM. The positives associated with the 
leasing deal included once again placing all of the major port facilities 
under one umbrella (important for marketing and efficiency reasons) and 
providing the Port with additional capacity and connections to critical 
railroad infrastructure. On the other side of the ledger, however, leasing the 
APM facility came at a hefty price and is estimated to cost approximately 
$1 billion over the 20 years. The cost of the lease is among the reasons why 
the Port has incurred financial losses in recent years.
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Port Finances
Since the VPA is a state agency, questions have emerged regarding its 
financial performance as well as the very closely connected financial 
performance of the Port. Graph 1 displays the Port’s operating revenues, 
expenses and net income (revenues minus expenses). These data provide an 
important measure of the success of the Port’s operations and how its fiscal 
health has changed over time. The data relate to the VPA fiscal years, which 
end on June 30. 
If net income is the criterion, then the Port often has not fared well financially 
over the last decade. In only three of the last 11 years has it experienced 
positive net operating income. The spike in operating costs since 2010 
reflects (among other things) the leasing costs for APM Terminals Virginia, 
which since has been renamed the Virginia International Gateway.
Operating revenues fell dramatically during the Great Recession, but then 
fell again in 2014. The former decline was understandable: weak economic 
conditions during that recession reduced maritime trade, and this was 
out of the control of management. However, the decline in 2014 cannot 
be similarly dismissed. A look at VPA financial statements reveals that the 
decline in revenue in FY 2014 was due primarily to a decline in revenue 
coming from the port operator, VIT. 
However, the Port’s performance in FY 2015 has rebounded smartly. 
Preliminary reports for FY 2015 indicate that the Port recorded net operating 
income of $16.1 million. It seems to have turned an important corner 
financially.   
The Port relies upon a variety of funding sources to finance its operations 
and capital expenditures (see Graph 2). Its operating revenues include 
grants and federal appropriations (for example, those coming from the 
federal government to finance the development of Craney Island), operating 
revenues from VIT and the VPA, and funds coming from the Commonwealth 
Port Fund.  
VIT’s contribution is the largest overall source of revenue at the Port and 
totaled $75 million in FY 2014. The Port also receives significant funding 
from the state via the Commonwealth Port Fund. This fund, in turn, annually 
receives 4.2 percent of Virginia’s Transportation Trust Fund receipts. This 
funding source accounted for almost 30 percent of the Port’s revenues in FY 
2014. This flow of income is intended to support capital projects at Virginia 
marine terminals, rather than run operations or develop off-terminal capital 
projects. A recent study by the Virginia Joint Legislative Audit and Review 
Commission (JLARC) advocated loosening these restrictions to include 
off-terminal capital expenses, which is the situation enjoyed by the Port’s 
competitors in Charleston and Savannah.
The Port’s dreary financial record during the previous decade led some to 
conclude that its operations were in need of a makeover. In 2011, then Gov. 
Bob McDonnell shook up the Virginia Port Authority board by replacing 10 
of its 11 members. In 2012, several private firms placed bids to take over 
operations of Port terminals from Virginia International Terminals. These 
companies believed they could manage operations more efficiently than VIT. 
The most serious suitor was APM Terminals, a company that just a few years 
prior leased its terminal in Portsmouth to the VPA. The proposed deal was 
estimated to be worth between $3 billion and $4 billion in today’s dollars 
over the proposed 48 years, and included APM eventually giving the VPA its 
container terminal in Portsmouth at the end of the lease period. 
The proposal was contentious for several different reasons, not the least that 
privatization of the Port’s management would have altered or destroyed 
well-established regional and Commonwealth business relationships. In 
addition, some were concerned that a private for-profit operator would 
make decisions based on its bottom line (rather than the welfare of the 
Commonwealth) and that APM might whipsaw this region against other 
ports, such as New York/New Jersey, where it also was involved. Ultimately, 
political pressure from a variety of sources torpedoed the idea.  
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GRAPH 1
NET OPERATING INCOME FOR THE VIRGINIA PORT AUTHORITY, FY 2004 THROUGH FY 2015 YTD 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
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GRAPH 2
VIRGINIA PORT AUTHORITY REVENUE BY SOURCE, FY 2014
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Nevertheless, it was not so long ago (June 1, 2014) that The Virginian-Pilot 
editorial board labeled the performance of the Port “a legacy of chaos.” In 
truth, the Port’s management and members of the board of directors have 
changed several times in recent years. However, in late 2013, the VPA 
appointed John Reinhart as the new executive director. The appointment 
of Reinhart was a move praised by members of the maritime community. 
He assumed the position at a time when Gov. Terry McAuliffe had voiced 
criticism of the Port’s finances and its long-term lease agreement for the APM 
terminal in Portsmouth.  
Reinhart is charged with turning around the Port’s finances and developing 
and leading its strategic vision for the future. In recent months, Port finances 
have rebounded from their mediocre performance over the past decade. 
The Port reported positive operating income for the second half 
of 2014, totaling $6.1 million. In broad strokes, Port officials point 
to cost-saving innovations and the elimination of redundancies between the 
VPA and VIT as important reasons for the improvement.
Types Of Cargo 
The Port Handles
Ports in the United States typically handle four broad classifications of cargo: 
(1) containers; (2) break bulk; (3) roll-on, roll-off and (4) bulk liquids, fuels 
and grains. The latter two classifications are the most easily understood. 
Roll-on/roll-off cargo consists of automobiles, trucks and motorcycles, while 
liquids and fuels include natural gas and oil. The Port of Virginia is not a 
big international player in either of these cargo classifications, though some 
believe that it could become much more aggressive in pursuing roll-on/
roll-off opportunities that relate to the importation of new automobiles from 
Europe and Asia. The Port of Baltimore currently dominates this market 
space in the Mid-Atlantic region.  
Containers come in many varieties, but the ubiquitous 20-foot equivalent unit 
(TEUs) easily is the dominant model. Hence, when people say that the Port is 
prospering (or declining), they usually are referring to changes in the volume 
of TEU traffic. Graph 3 depicts the Port’s TEU traffic over the past decade. 
Note the dramatic decline in TEU traffic that occurred in 2009 because 
of the effects of the Great Recession. Port activity is quite sensitive to the 
business cycle – and not just the U.S. business cycle. If China’s economic 
growth rate continues to decline, and Europe remains in the economic 
doldrums, this will be reflected in stagnant or declining TEU traffic at the Port 
of Virginia. The reverse also holds – when these countries prosper, the Port 
of Virginia does well. Indeed, usually 50 percent to 55 percent of all cargo 
handled by the Port involves exports to other countries.
Break bulk cargo includes materials that cannot easily be containerized, but 
typically arrive as a single unit. Examples include large pieces of machinery, 
such as Caterpillar D-11 tractors, and pallets of rubber and paper. One 
might conclude from Graph 4 that break bulk cargo has not been the forte 
of the Port of Virginia and that there is considerable room for growth in this 
regard. The not-so-heavily used Portsmouth Marine Terminal may present 
such an opportunity.  
Whether the Port of Virginia actually is losing money for the 
Commonwealth is less clear than it might first seem because 
of the VPA’s complicated structure and financing, state 
subsidies, complex capital investments, leases, depreciation 
and its economic impact. Viewed as a private business, the 
Port often has lost money. Viewed as a public enterprise 
designed to stimulate economic activity in Virginia, the 
answer is not the same. An economic impact study of the 
Port performed by the College of William & Mary in 2014 
reveals that the Port is a major economic engine for Virginia. 
Does this mean that the VPA can be forgiven its deficits? 
Probably not, but it does place the VPA in a different light.
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Roll-on/roll-off cargoes include automobiles and trucks. 
Sporadically, the Port has registered this type of activity, but 
trails competitors such as Baltimore by a wide margin in this 
market. Once again, there is room for improvement.
The major bulk cargo coming through Hampton Roads today is 
coal, but virtually all of that coal is handled by Norfolk Southern 
Corp. at its private-sector Lamberts Point Coal Terminal. (This 
means that the 47 million tons of coal handled in 2011 by 
Norfolk Southern do not appear in Graphs 3 or 4.)
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 201562
GRAPH 3
TWENTY-FOOT EQUIVALENT UNITS (TEUS) HANDLED BY THE PORT OF VIRGINIA, 2005-2015
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GRAPH 4
CONTAINER AND BREAK BULK CARGO (IN MILLIONS OF TONS), 2011-2015






    Source: Virginia Port Authority. Note that tonnage is measured in April of each year. 
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MOVING THE PORT’S CARGOES
A critical complement to the activity of any port is the transportation 
infrastructure that serves it. Customers located within 200 to 250 miles of 
most American ports typically receive their orders via trucks that have been 
loaded at the ports. This is “captive” cargo that is unlikely to be lost to other 
ports, or to railroads, unless the service provided is exceptionally poor, or 
the prices being charged are particularly high. Beyond the 200- to 250-
mile radius, however, train transportation becomes more cost-effective and 
competition from other ports usually becomes more important. The Port of 
Virginia competes with the likes of New York/New Jersey, Savannah and 
other Atlantic Coast ports for these customers and cargoes. Thus, prospective 
customers located in cities such as Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, 
Detroit, Indianapolis and Memphis benefit from competition among Atlantic 
Coast ports. Price and service competition in these markets is intense.
Currently, about one-third of the cargoes unloaded at the Port of Virginia 
are delivered to customers via rail. This percentage has risen in recent years 
because of competitive improvements by Norfolk Southern and CSX. Norfolk 
Southern, for example, now can double-stack TEUs on the railroad cars 
traversing many routes from the Port of Virginia into the interior of the United 
States. This has lowered its costs and reduced delivery times.  
The Wall Street Journal has written about logistics and congestion problems 
at the Port of Virginia,1 though such difficulties are characteristic of most 
large U.S. ports today. These problems have resulted in long queues of 
truckers at our Port and formal complaints by organizations such as the 
Tidewater Motor Truck Association, for whom time is money. The Port has 
responded by extending hours, scheduling truck appointments, acquiring 
more truck chassis, retooling work patterns, utilizing new software, etc., and 
has approved a healthy $123 million capital budget that includes $43.35 
million for new container-handling equipment. This FY 2016 capital budget 
is larger in size than the capital budgets for the last four fiscal years 
combined and represents solid recognition of outstanding needs.  
1  Arian Campo-Flores and Cameron McWhirter, “U.S. Ports See Costly Delays as Cargo Ships, Volumes 
Grow,” The Wall Street Journal (April 29, 2015), www.wsj.com.
Those interested in long-term solutions to these logistical challenges usually 
are strong proponents of the construction of a third crossing across the 
James River estuary, or a variant such as the proposed Patriot’s Crossing, 
a new four-lane tunnel that would link I-564 and the Port’s major Norfolk 
terminal with I-664 and the Monitor-Merrimac Memorial Bridge-Tunnel. 
They also advocate widening I-64 to Richmond and a package of other 
improvements, including the high-rise drawbridge on the southern extremity 
of I-64 in Chesapeake.  
There is little doubt that improvements would benefit the Port and enable 
traffic in and out of the Port to move more expeditiously. There are, however, 
two caveats. First, highway transportation already is highly subsidized by 
governments at all levels (at least when compared to rail traffic) and it is 
not clear that further car and truck subsidies are merited from an economic 
standpoint.2 Second, the multibillion-dollar cost of these improvements, plus 
emerging environmental issues, makes the package difficult to swallow. In 
this regard, revenues from the 0.7 percent regional sales tax increase that 
was implemented a few years ago are insufficient to pay for the projects 
2  This is the conclusion of a March 2015 Congressional Budget Office Study by David Austin, www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/50049-Freight_Transport_Working_Paper-2.pdf.
The peak-time toll trucks will pay in 2016 for the 
Elizabeth River crossings will be $7.36. If this toll 
increases at 3.5 percent annually until 2070, when the 
ERC agreement ends, it will rise to $47.17. If, however, toll 
increases match the consumer price index when the CPI 
rises by more than 3.5 percent, then the peak-time truck 
toll will skyrocket to $86.24. The CPI provision plausibly 
would increase ERC’s total toll revenue by 82 percent. In 
addition, ERC’s agreement allows it to earn 13.5 percent 
on its invested capital and requires the Commonwealth to 
reimburse it if competitive facilities are constructed that 
drain its revenue.   
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just noted. Thus, it appears that tolls will be necessary to finance these 
improvements.    
Tolls are not a popular solution to improving the transportation infrastructure 
that would benefit the Port. The region’s experience with tolls on traffic 
traveling through the Midtown and Downtown tunnels across the Elizabeth 
River has been mixed. Portsmouth is bearing a disproportionate share of 
the costs of these projects, while the benefits are distributed more evenly 
throughout the region.  
Additionally, it now is clear that the Commonwealth did not cover itself 
with glory when it negotiated its tunnel deals with the Elizabeth River Co. 
(ERC), which is building an additional Midtown Tunnel tube and a connector 
between Route 164 and I-264, plus other renovations. ERC will manage and 
operate the entire enterprise when completed, and negotiated a 58-year 
contract that grants it the ability to increase tolls through the two tunnels 
by 3.5 percent annually, or the annual growth rate of the consumer price 
index, whichever is larger. If the behavior of the CPI over the past 
58 years is an appropriate guide, then this provision of ERC’s 
agreement with the Commonwealth will result in an increase 
in the peak-time toll for trucks – from $7.36 in 2016 to $86.24 
in 2070. This is hardly good news for the Port. Locally, some 
truckers travel back and forth to the Port several times per day 
and this would impose a significant financial burden on them. 
At the margin, such costs may cause some national shippers 
and truckers to shift their patronage away from the Port of 
Virginia to other East Coast ports. Arguably, an important 
public policy objective of our region is to find ways to 
moderate likely future toll increases across the Elizabeth River.  
The Panama Canal
Container shipping is a $6 trillion world industry that moves more than 
95 percent of the world’s manufactured goods (The Wall Street Journal, June 
2, 2015). It is a marketplace beset by a variety of problems, however, one 
of which is the overcapacity of ships that carry the containers. There are too 
many ships and too much ship capacity available relative to the demand for 
such. This has been exacerbated by the appearance of massive new vessels 
that can carry up to 20,000 TEUs. APM Maersk, for example, ordered 20 
supersized ships in 2011, each of which will carry more than 18,000 TEUs, 
and recently announced a $1.8 billion order for 11 new megaships that will 
handle more than 19,000 TEUs each (Costas Paris, The Wall Street Journal, 
June 5, 2015). As recently as 10 years ago, such an array of ships was no 
more than a pipe dream. 
Container traffic through the Panama Canal peaked in 2007 (when 3,600 
ships transited through it) and since then has declined approximately 20 
percent (2,891 container ships in 2014). There are two reasons for this. 
First, the Canal currently cannot handle ships that carry more than about 
5,000 TEUs. Second, the Canal’s technology and operations are costly and 
outdated. Taken together, these two factors have constituted a recipe for 
decline in a world where ship sizes are growing by leaps and bounds.  
Panama is in the midst of a $5.5 billion expansion that includes upgrades 
to the coastal locks and enormous rolling gates that move ships into higher 
or lower bodies of water. Additionally, entrances on both sides of the Canal 
will be dredged to a lower depth. The expansion of the Canal is set for 
completion in early 2016 (but this may be optimistic).  
After expansion, the Canal will be able to handle ships that carry as many 
as 13,000 TEUs and require water depth of at least 50 feet. It also will 
be able to accommodate 97 percent of the global merchant fleet (Shawn 
Donnan, Financial Times, May 26, 2015). The problem is that a dozen 
huge ships are now afloat that can carry 20,000 TEUs or more and at least 
50 active ships already exist that handle more than 13,000 TEUs. Hence, 
while its expansion brightens the future of the Canal, ship economics have 
changed so rapidly that the expanded Canal will be obsolete before it ever 
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opens. It may lose out to the Suez Canal, where much larger ship traffic is 
concerned. Maersk already has moved some of its largest ship traffic in the 
direction of the Suez Canal. 
Ocean carriers such as Maersk and Hanjin (and their customers) will 
carefully evaluate their options for carrying product to the East Coast. They 
can ship directly to the U.S. West Coast and then move cargo via rail to 
locations such as New York City and Atlanta. Or, they can move cargo 
through the Panama Canal. Or, they can route their ships through the Suez 
Canal – a route increasingly favored by expanding South Asian exporters. 
Finally, in a few circumstances, they can send ships around either Cape 
Horn or the Cape of Good Hope. Ultimately, their choices will depend upon 
the cost of each route and the time it takes to ply that route. The expansion 
of the Panama Canal is not going to alter this decision calculus a great deal. 
PANAMA CANAL READINESS ON THE EAST COAST
The Port of Virginia already can handle any ship that will come through 
the expanded Panama Canal. Indeed, with some adjustments, the Port will 
be able to handle even the huge 20,000-TEU-capacity ships now being 
constructed. Predictably, however, many East Coast ports are updating 
their infrastructure (deeper channels and larger dockside container cranes) 
in hopes of winning the competition for larger vessels coming through the 
Canal. A conservative estimate is that at least $6 billion is being spent 
by competitor ports to ready themselves for larger ships. This includes the 
estimated $1.3 billion to raise the Bayonne Bridge at the Port of New York 
and New Jersey and $2 billion-plus in improvements at the Port of Miami, 
which includes cranes and intermodal transit upgrades. The good news, 
however, is that the Port of Virginia now is able to handle large ships that 
several of its competitor ports cannot. This advantage is likely to disappear 
in a few years.
The Port Of Virginia’s 
Major Competitors
Graph 5 shows the average monthly TEUs handled at four major East 
Coast ports. The Port of Virginia is the third-largest container port on the 
East Coast, trailing only Savannah and New York/New Jersey. The Port is 
roughly tied for the distinction of being the fifth-largest port in the United 
States with the Port of Oakland. Both handled approximately 200,000 TEUs 
per month in 2014.  
New York/New Jersey usually is our biggest competition for rail container 
traffic into the Midwest, while Savannah, and to a lesser extent Charleston, 
is a natural rival for Mid-Atlantic retail goods and regional distribution 
centers. In 2006, the ports of Virginia, Savannah and Charleston all 
recorded about the same level of TEU throughput. Each experienced a 
decrease in volume during the Great Recession. Since then, however, the 
three ports’ paths have diverged. In the past few years, the Port of Virginia 
has moved past Charleston. Savannah, however, has leaped ahead of 
both the Port of Virginia and Charleston and now has established itself 
firmly as the second-largest port on the Eastern Seaboard. Charleston, 
though, appears to have overcome management and political problems and 
probably will emerge as a much tougher competitor in the years to come.
Many within the maritime industry contend that Savannah’s rise is due to its 
ability to attract large retail shippers (such as Wal-Mart) that have invested in 
regional distribution centers. The Port of Savannah’s progress was facilitated 
by generous state economic development incentives, including ready-to-go 
sites outside that port, but it also enjoys the advantage of being the closest 
port to Atlanta and the burgeoning Southeast region. Meanwhile, the Port of 
Virginia’s strategy has been a bit different and has focused a little more on 
solidifying contractual relationships with the largest shipping carriers in the 
world, such as Cosco, CMA and Maersk.  
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GRAPH  5
AVERAGE MONTHLY TOTAL TEUS FOR SELECTED EAST COAST PORTS
Source: American Association of Port Authorities. Data represent a three-month moving average for total TEUs.
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Savannah’s conspicuous success perhaps has stimulated the Commonwealth 
to place more emphasis on economic development incentives in order to 
encourage businesses to locate or expand their operations in Hampton 
Roads. These incentives include the Barge and Rail Tax Credit, the 
International Trade Facility Tax Credit and the Port Volume Tax Credit. All 
of these programs make Hampton Roads and Virginia financially more 
attractive locations for firms that might otherwise locate or expand near 
a different port. The ill-fated Route 460 development at one time was 
considered to be part of this thrust because it was advertised as reducing the 
costs of trucking cargo in and out of the Port.
Battles for import cargo extend well beyond the East Coast. Ships traversing 
the Pacific Ocean from countries such as China and Japan, with cargoes 
intended for the East Coast, can opt to land at ports such as Los Angeles 
and Long Beach and then send their cargoes to the East Coast via rail. 
Graph 6 shows growth in containerized cargo for ports on the East Coast 
and West Coast, plus the Gulf of Mexico between fourth quarter 2013 and 
fourth quarter 2014. During this four-quarter time period, East Coast ports 
grew at over 11 percent compared to less than 3 percent for their West 
Coast rivals. Some of this differential likely was due to labor problems that 
slowed or idled West Coast ports during 2014 and extended into early 
2015.  
While containerized import traffic at the Port of Virginia grew at a healthy 
pace of 8.4 percent between fourth quarter 2013 and fourth quarter 
2014, the Port nevertheless lagged behind its larger rivals on the Eastern 
Seaboard in this regard. Still, a bright spot for the Port of Virginia is that 
several of its major competitors will not be ready to host the largest ships for 
several years. This will provide the Port with an opportunity to increase its 
containerized market share. 
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GRAPH 6
GROWTH IN U.S. PORT CONTAINERIZED IMPORTS, Q4 2013 TO Q4 2014 
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The Port Of Virginia And The 
Hampton Roads Economy 
Several studies have attempted to quantify the total impact of the Port of 
Virginia on the Hampton Roads economy, the most prominent of which was 
a 2014 study completed by the Mason School of Business at the College 
of William & Mary that attributed 6.8 percent of the Commonwealth’s 
gross state product to the Port, along with 374,000 jobs and $60 billion in 
related spending.3  
These are impressively large numbers, but one cannot perform an economic 
impact study without making a series of assumptions about how and where 
economic activity occurs. One of the most critical assumptions relates to 
how much and how quickly economic activity “leaks” from the region and 
the Commonwealth. Consider a longshoreman who is working at the Port. 
How much of the wages he/she receives at the Port does he/she spend on 
goods and services in Virginia? When the Port purchases large pieces of 
equipment, does it purchase those items from firms in South Korea rather 
than Virginia? The answers to these questions make a huge difference when 
one is estimating economic impact. To the extent that the expenditures are 
made outside of Virginia, the economic impact of the Port is diminished. The 
economic ripples inside Virginia that are generated by the Port are reduced 
when expenditure leakages occur. Much the same thing occurs when wages 
are saved rather than spent.
Any economic impact study also must rely upon assumptions concerning 
the degree of “agglomeration” – often referred to as clustering – that 
is present. Simply put, while sometimes it may seem otherwise, firms in 
related industries often benefit as more of them cluster together in the same 
area. Agglomeration can increase labor supplies, reduce costs, stimulate 
firm productivity and spur innovation. More to the point, the formation of 
an industry cluster in Virginia usually reduces economic leakages outside 
Virginia because individuals don’t have to go elsewhere to find what they 
3  www.portofvirginia.com/pdfs/POV%20Econ%20Impact%20Study%202014.pdf.
need. It is important that any economic impact study get these relationships 
right, but the truth is that there are several popular economic impact-
estimating models that approach these matters in different ways.    
A variety of other assumptions also must be made in order to generate an 
economic impact study, and differing assumptions lead to disparate results. 
The William & Mary study provides a competent, plausible estimate to the 
Port’s economic impact, though its estimates impress some professionals as 
being somewhat generous.  
Even so, we can drill down into our regional economy to see how the Port 
affects specific economic activities and sectors. Figure 1 compares the share 
of gross regional product generated by the transportation, warehousing 
and wholesale trade sectors for several regions that boast large ports. 
Direct Port-related activities directly generate approximately 
6 percent of Hampton Roads’ regional gross domestic product 
(GDP). This is a smaller percentage than holds true for many of 
the Port’s East Coast competitors.  
The industries identified in Figure 1 are those most likely to benefit from 
the Port. Railroads, which handle approximately one-third of the cargo 
exiting from the Port of Virginia, are major beneficiaries of Port activity. So 
also are regional distribution centers, exemplified by the Target warehouse 
distribution facility in Suffolk. 
Figure 2 traces employment in the same sectors. Hampton Roads employs 
almost 50,000 people in Port-related industries – a slightly higher 
percentage than Savannah and Charleston. Interestingly, while the Port of 
Savannah’s success in attracting regional distribution centers has received 
much favorable attention, and no doubt helps that city’s tax base, it does 
not appear to have created substantial employment differences between 
Savannah and Hampton Roads. Indeed, while the Port of Savannah moves 
more cargo than the Port of Virginia, it utilizes fewer employees in the 
transportation and trade sector as it does so. This could reflect greater 
efficiency in its warehousing activities, necessitating fewer employees, larger 
capital investments that make workers more productive, or other factors.
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The Port asserts that every 1,000 increase in container traffic 
creates 300 new jobs (both direct and spinoff) that pay an 
average wage of $46,000. While the job number in particular 
appears to be a generous estimate, there is no dispute 
that Port activities create jobs both directly at the Port and 
indirectly in many industries that either supply the Port or 
serve its employees.
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FIGURE 1
TRANSPORTATION, WAREHOUSING AND WHOLESALE TRADE SHARE OF REAL REGIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 2012-2013
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FIGURE 2 
TRANSPORTATION, WAREHOUSING AND WHOLESALE TRADE EMPLOYMENT, 2012-2013
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Productivity Issues
It is not easy to measure and compare the productivity of ports because 
of the different ways each port measures and records its activities. 
Nonetheless, ports sometimes are compared on the basis of measures such 
as the number of TEUs they move per hour that a ship is at berth. While its 
performance has been improving recently, the Port of Virginia does not fare 
particularly well in these comparisons, according to the JOC Group, which 
annually ranks the world’s ports in terms of the number of container moves 
they make per hour per ship at berth (JOC Group, “Berth Productivity,” July 
2014). In 2013, for example, New York/New Jersey, Baltimore, Savannah 
and Charleston, in this order, all recorded more container moves per hour 
than the Port of Virginia. However, the Port of Virginia believes that a 
measure focusing on moves per hour when a ship is at berth potentially 
distorts actual productivity because it ignores the number of cranes involved. 
Five cranes unloading a ship at a larger port might move more TEUs per 
hour than three cranes unloading the same ship at the Port of Virginia, but 
the larger port’s capital-intensive approach likely would be more expensive. 
Reliable data permitting cost comparisons among ports are difficult to obtain 
because privately owned operations seldom make such information public. 
Thus, it is difficult to issue a flat statement that the Port of Virginia either is, or 
is not, more (less) efficient than its competitors.    
Nevertheless, the Port’s performance by the container-moves metric has 
been improving. In a January 2015 presentation, VPA CEO and Executive 
Director John Reinhart reported that through December of the 2015 fiscal 
year, the number of container moves per hour had increased by 8.82 
percent at Virginia International Gateway and 10.52 percent at VIT.4 Such 
improvements are desirable, but the Port’s current logistical problems relate 
primarily to what happens to cargo once it has been unloaded from berthed 
ships, rather than to the number of moves per hour as it unloads ships. 
It may be necessary for the Commonwealth to increase its capital 
investments in the Port and surrounding infrastructure in order for necessary 
productivity and logistical improvements to continue. The Port’s current level 
4  www.portofvirginia.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Productivity-Summit-01-23-15.
of financial support from the Commonwealth for capital improvements does 
not constitute a magic number generated by hard analysis, and instead 
reflects a set of political compromises greatly affected by the money that 
happened to be available to the General Assembly in particular legislative 
years. While it would be unfair to label the size of the current stream of 
funding accidental, it also would be a misrepresentation to imply that it is 
the result of rigorous analysis. 
Final Thoughts
Given the rather sluggish nature of defense spending, and 
the relatively modest recovery of tourism, the Port of Virginia 
represents an economic engine of growing importance to 
Hampton Roads. There is much talk about the need to diversify 
the regional economy; the Port represents such diversification. 
Figure 3 displays the logos of firms that expanded in Virginia 
in 2014 and whose expansion was at least partially dependent 
on the Port of Virginia. These 34 firms intend to invest $2.6 
billion in sites, plant and equipment in the Commonwealth.
The Port also serves a set of markets that are growing faster than either the 
U.S. economy or the world economy. For example, in 2014, both the U.S. 
economy and the world economy grew at rates below 3 percent. Container 
traffic at the Port of Virginia, however, grew at more than 8 percent. 
The Port of Virginia is well situated to handle the huge super ships, with 
capacities of up to 20,000 TEUs, that either already have been launched, 
or are being constructed in the world’s shipyards. Currently, only the Port 
of Virginia and the Port of Baltimore are capable of handling large ships 
with 50-foot drafts, and Baltimore still lacks the impressive rail connections 
that our Port boasts. If the Port of Virginia is able to deal effectively with its 
current logistical challenges, then it will be able to handle the burgeoning 
container traffic that almost surely will characterize the future. The economic 
rewards that will flow as a consequence to Hampton Roads and the 
Commonwealth will be substantial. 
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FIGURE 3
LOGOS OF 34 FIRMS WHOSE EXPANSION IN 2014 IN VIRGINIA WAS CONNECTED TO THE PORT OF VIRGINIA
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THE THIRD ECONOMIC SECTOR: NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
IN HAMPTON ROADS AND THE UNITED WAY
W
hen we think of the nonprofit sector of our economy, community charities and foundations often come to mind. In reality, the sector is much 
more complex and includes a wide range of organizations such as hospitals, universities, private schools, animal and environmental 
welfare organizations, museums and churches. Most Americans have interacted with the nonprofit sector at some point in their lifetime, 
perhaps as an employee at a child day care center, as a client of a social services organization, as a church volunteer or as a donor to a 
natural-disaster-relief fund.  
Yet, many among us are unaware of the scope, impact and value of this 
often-overlooked sector. This chapter provides a broad overview of the 
nonprofit sector in the United States, followed by a focused look at Hampton 
Roads. Narrowing further, we explore the role and impact of the United 
Way of South Hampton Roads and its certified agencies in the community.  
At A Glance: The Nonprofit 
Sector In The United States
Nationally, nearly 1.6 million nonprofit organizations are registered with the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This number does not include churches, clubs 
or other volunteer associations that are not required to register with the IRS. 
In 2010, the nonprofit sector employed 9 percent of the American workforce 
with almost $577 billion in paid wages. In this same year, the nonprofit 
sector contributed approximately 5.5 percent ($804 billion) of the gross 
domestic product (K.L. Roeger et al., The Nonprofit Almanac, 2012).  
Nonprofit organizations are distinct from private-sector corporations and 
public-sector agencies in that they have been granted 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
status by the IRS because of their charitable or educational purpose. This 
means they do not have to pay federal corporate income taxes and can 
accept gifts that often are accompanied by the benefit of tax deductibility for 
those who give. Most states imitate the federal government in this regard.  
In 2010, nonprofit organizations filing with the IRS reported $2.06 trillion 
in revenues and $4.49 trillion in assets. The revenue sources of nonprofit 
organizations in 2010 were diverse. A breakdown by percentage shows 
private fees for services (tuition payments, bills for client services and 
ticket sales) as the largest revenue source, totaling 49.6 percent of all 
revenues. Fees received from government sources (Medicare, Medicaid 
and government contracts) were the second-largest source of income at 
23.9 percent. The largest other categories include private contributions 
(13.3 percent) and government grants (8.3 percent). In 2013, the largest 
contributors to the nonprofit sector were health organizations (53 percent), 
education (15 percent) and human services organizations (18 percent), 
according to the Urban Institute.    
The nonprofit sector is commonly associated with volunteering. The 
Corporation for National and Community Service reported that in 2013, 
62.6 million people volunteered with a nonprofit organization. This has 
been valued at $173 billion in service contributed by unpaid volunteers. Of 
these 62.6 million volunteers, 36.2 million were women, 21.7 million were 
parents, 20.5 million were part of the baby boomer generation and 5.2 
million were veterans.  
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In a 2012 state-by-state comparison, Utah boasted the highest volunteer 
rate, with 43.8 percent of its adult population volunteering during that year. 
New York reported the lowest rate for its adult population – 20.6 percent – 
volunteering at nonprofit organizations. Virginia fell in the middle of the list, 
at 28.5 percent (National Center for Charitable Statistics).
The nonprofit sector is also associated with giving and philanthropy. 
On average, Americans donate approximately $300 billion per year 
to charities in the nonprofit sector (National Public Radio, “Why Do We 
Give?” Nov. 25, 2011). In 2012, 88 percent of households in the United 
States contributed financially to some charity (National Philanthropic Trust, 
2015). In 2013, individuals gave $241.32 billion to charities, followed by 
foundations ($52.28 billion) and corporations ($16.76 billion). The majority 
of gifts were given to religious organizations (31 percent), education (16 
percent), human services organizations (12 percent) and grant-making 
foundations (11 percent). We’ll examine giving statistics for Hampton Roads 
in a section below.
The Nonprofit Sector In 
Hampton Roads
According to the National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2,009 public 
charity nonprofit organizations from the Hampton Roads area submitted 
tax returns to the IRS in 2012 (the most recent year for which data are 
available). Nonprofit organizations with less than $25,000 in gross receipts 
are not required to file a tax return with the IRS, nor are any churches. Thus, 
the figures provided in this chapter do not represent the actual number of 
nonprofit organizations in the region, but instead represent those charitable 
nonprofit organizations that filed tax returns with the IRS.  
The data supplied in Table 1 disclose that charitable nonprofit organizations 
in Hampton Roads include 691 human services organizations (child abuse 
prevention centers, homeless shelters, senior centers, thrift shops), followed 
by 409 public/social benefit organizations (veterans organizations, non-
profit public utilities, credit unions) and 272 educational organizations 
(universities, libraries, alumni associations). Health organizations (hospitals, 
health clinics, blood banks) accounted for 163.  
TABLE 1
PUBLIC CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN 
HAMPTON ROADS THAT FILE WITH THE IRS






Human Services 691 34%
Public, Social Benefit 409 20%
Education 272 14%
Health 163   8%
Arts, Culture and Humanities 162   8%
Religion Related 118*   6%
Mutual/Membership Benefit   85   4%
Environment and Animals   75   4%
International, Foreign Affairs   30   1%
Unknown, Unclassified    4 --
Total 2,009
Source: The Urban Institute, NCCS Core File (Public Charities, 2012) http://nccsweb.urban.org/nccs.php 
*This number is an underestimate because religious organizations are not required to submit tax returns to 
the IRS.
The number of religion-related organizations (118) in the Table 1 sample 
does not represent the total number of religious organizations and 
congregations in Hampton Roads because they are not required to submit 
tax returns to the IRS.  
A breakdown of the revenues of public charity nonprofit organizations in 
Hampton Roads illustrates the financial impact these organizations have 
on the local community. Table 2 reveals that the revenues for the 2,009 
organizations filing an IRS tax return in 2012 totaled more than $9.6 
billion, with approximately $7.4 billion of the revenues coming from fees for 
program services offered by the nonprofit organizations. In addition, these 
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 201580
organizations received nearly $1.5 billion in charitable gifts, contributions 
and grants; $160 million in investment income (e.g., dividends, rents, 
securities); and $626 million in other income (such as sales of goods and 
assets). Not surprisingly, health-oriented nonprofit organizations earned the 
highest revenues ($6.7 billion) and had the highest expenses ($6.3 billion), 
even though they make up only 8 percent of the 2,009 nonprofits in the 
area. Human services organizations, which comprise 34 percent of the 
nonprofits in Hampton Roads, recorded revenues totaling more than $729 
million and expenses of approximately $706 million.
TABLE 2 

















Arts, Culture and Humanities $209,848,704 $63,680,934 $85,529,692 $11,935,765 $48,702,313 $231,570,828 $75,559,249
Education $721,030,156 $409,292,608 $230,554,518 $32,263,300 $48,919,730 $630,009,721 $218,179,265
Environment and Animals $77,810,238 $20,625,832 $52,591,629 $1,266,265 $3,326,512 $70,212,987 $22,917,910
Health $6,742,248,492 $6,203,828,601 $122,846,315 $89,741,426 $325,832,150 $6,316,058,797 $1,935,197,863
Human Services $729,786,729 $428,780,994 $254,646,031 $8,096,150 $38,263,554 $706,170,479 $236,400,047
International, Foreign Affairs $305,512,797 $3,359,479 $302,228,225 $244,971 $-319,878* $293,146,827 $14,716,595
Mutual/Membership Benefit $91,499,836 $79,166,408 $1,905,267 $1,393,515 $9,034,646 $89,445,438 $1,621,653
Public, Social Benefit $406,261,394 $166,604,008 $187,673,425 $13,547,338 $38,436,623 $370,098,871 $84,018,811
Religion Related $349,523,120 $9,116,631 $224,351,186 $1,771,059 $114,284,244 $340,586,282 $69,350,932
Unknown, Unclassified $395,719 $310,875 $506 $0 $84,338 $362,188 $0
TOTAL $9,633,917,185 $7,384,766,370 $1,462,326,794 $160,259,789 $626,564,232 $9,047,662,418 $2,657,962,325
Source: The Urban Institute, NCCS Core File (Public Charities, 2012), http://nccsweb.urban.org/nccs.php 
In 2012, the 2,009 public charity nonprofit organizations in Hampton 
Roads paid approximately $2.6 billion in wages and benefits to their 
employees. Health-oriented nonprofits alone paid wages of $1.9 billion. 
Human services nonprofits were next at nearly $236 million in paid 
wages, with education nonprofits close behind at $218 million. Clearly, the 
nonprofit sector is an important employer within Hampton Roads.
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The Generous Ones: Those 
Who Give And Grant In 
Hampton Roads
Nonprofit organizations could not exist without the charitable contributions 
and gifts they receive from individuals, corporations, governments and 
foundations. Simply put, however, some individuals are more generous than 
others.   
Table 3 reports the percentages of household incomes given to charitable 
endeavors in Hampton Roads cities, other cities in Virginia and in the United 
States.  
The typical Virginian gave 2.85 percent of his/her income to charitable 
endeavors (including religious organizations) in 2012, but residents of 
Hampton Roads gave 3.41 percent. Both, however, trail the United States 
average of 3.7 percent.  
The residents of Hampton and Portsmouth are the most 
generous givers (at 4.25 percent and 4.22 percent of incomes, 
respectively) in our sample, while Virginia Beach residents are 
the least generous, at 3.11 percent. Even so, Virginia Beach’s 
level of giving towers above that of Loudoun County (which 
boasts the highest average household income of any city or 
county in Virginia). These Washington, D.C., suburbanites gave 
only 1.98 percent their 2012 household incomes to charitable 
endeavors. It may not be ironic, but it certainly is notable that 
Portsmouth, a city whose residents are much less prosperous 
financially, nonetheless more than doubled Loudoun County 
in terms of the percentage of residents’ income given to 
charitable endeavors. This suggests a degree of anomie and 
lack of identification of Loudoun County residents with their 
surroundings.    
TABLE 3
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING 



















Newport News $80,051,000 3.75%
Fairfax County $1,211,001,000 2.40%
Alexandria $145,243,000 2.36%
Arlington County $209,199,000 2.09%







Source: The Chronicle of Philanthropy, https://philanthropy.com/interactives/how-america-gives#state/51
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Nonprofit organizations that have attained 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status 
with the Internal Revenue Service often dispense grants to individuals 
and organizations they deem most worthy. Table 4 reveals the “top 40” 
charitable foundations headquartered in Virginia, ranked by the volume 
of the grants they made in 2012. Note that even though these foundations 
are located in Virginia, some of the grants they make go to individuals and 
organizations outside of Virginia.
Also note that eight of the top 40 foundations are located in Hampton 
Roads. At least three of these foundations are connected to the Batten family, 
which has assembled a truly outstanding record of charitable giving to a 
broad range of causes in Hampton Roads, Virginia and elsewhere. The 
family’s beneficent influence is writ large in our region.
TABLE 4
THE TOP 40: THE LARGEST VIRGINIA-BASED 
CHARITABLE GIVING ORGANIZATIONS IN 2012
Organization Name 2012 Grants
Charities Aid Foundation America $46,130,928 
The NRA Foundation Inc. $23,162,338 
The Freddie Mac Foundation $22,132,385 
The Community Foundation Serving Richmond & 
Central Virginia
$20,759,839 
Batten Foundation $20,050,000 
Jack Kent Cooke Foundation $20,038,020 
Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation $14,920,448 
Hampton Roads Community Foundation $14,826,518 
SunTrust Mid-Atlantic Foundation $10,962,442 
The Northrop Grumman Foundation $10,573,327 
Blue Moon Fund Inc. $9,984,260 
Danville Regional Foundation $9,043,053 
The Charlottesville Area Community Foundation $7,261,583 
Norfolk Southern Foundation $6,984,677 
Gannett Foundation $6,843,044 
Aimee and Frank Batten Jr. Foundation $6,303,510 
William H., John G. and Emma Scott Foundation $5,875,785 
Robins Foundation $5,875,758 
The Landmark Communications Foundation $5,404,467 
MeadWestvaco Foundation $5,365,864 
Robert G. Cabell III and Maude Morgan Cabell 
Foundation
$4,632,220 
The Mary Morton Parsons Foundation $4,609,000 
Water Environment Research Foundation $4,526,561 
The Cameron Foundation $4,344,765 
Virginia Health Care Foundation $4,108,000 
CarMax Foundation $3,386,550 
Genworth Foundation $3,140,360 
AMERIGROUP Foundation $3,037,005 
The Alleghany Foundation $2,996,419 
Foundation for Roanoke Valley Inc. $2,497,431 
Massey Foundation $2,470,000 
Mustard Seed Foundation Inc. $2,374,246 
Northern Virginia Community Foundation $2,003,980 
Harry Bramhall Gilbert Charitable Trust $1,937,501 
Beazley Foundation Inc. $1,779,019 
The Claude Moore Charitable Foundation $1,742,064 
The Loyola Foundation Inc. $1,526,023 
Richard S. Reynolds Foundation $1,458,253 
The Greater Lynchburg Community Trust $1,331,286 
Weissberg Foundation $1,312,509 
Source: www.tgci.com/funding-sources/VA/top  
Note: Organizations and foundations headquartered in Hampton Roads are indicated in red.
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A Case Study: United Way 
Of South Hampton Roads
Human services organizations are at the heart of service delivery in the 
nonprofit sector. They vary widely in the services they provide; some of 
the organizations offer care to neglected or disadvantaged individuals 
in need of assistance, while others focus on enhancing or advocating 
for the community. Human services nonprofits are of two types: informal 
organizations including community-based nonprofits, such as Alcoholics 
Anonymous or church soup kitchens, and formal agencies that have 
recognized 501(c)(3) status with the IRS, for example, the Salvation Army 
or the American Red Cross. One human services nonprofit that has had 
a tremendous impact on our region is the United Way of South Hampton 
Roads. 
United Way of South Hampton Roads (www.unitedwayshr.org) is dedicated 
to bringing individuals, groups and institutions together to address social 
problems such as hunger, poverty, homelessness, domestic violence, 
education gaps, and concerns of the disabled, sick and elderly. The 
organization interacts with many different communities to address complex 
social issues by identifying critical needs and achieving results that are 
geared toward long-term solutions.
As a method for solving community problems, United Way of South 
Hampton Roads (UWSHR) engages in a process it refers to as Collective 
Impact. This approach begins by identifying a broad problem and its 
root causes, then building a network of nonprofits, government agencies, 
schools, businesses, philanthropists, faith communities, neighborhood groups 
and community leaders with a common goal to work together to solve the 
problem. Rather than one nonprofit organization focusing on an 
isolated need, the Collective Impact initiative creates a path for 
facilitating collaborative efforts of individuals and institutions 
across the public, private and nonprofit sectors. 
One particular initiative, United for Children, brought more than 50 partners 
together to drive educational success for our poorest children as a way out 
of poverty. Founding members include the city of Norfolk, Norfolk Public 
Schools, Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Eastern Virginia 
Medical School, Old Dominion University, Hampton Roads Community 
Foundation and numerous community leaders. UWSHR provided the 
supporting structure, pulling in additional arts and faith-based partners to 
support the children in and outside the classroom. Now in its third year, 
United for Children is showing significant, measurable results in improved 
student reading and math scores. The program supports more than 2,000 
children living in poverty in Norfolk, Suffolk and Virginia Beach.
A new Collective Impact, Mission United, will launch this year and focus on 
providing support and solving problems for active-duty military, veterans and 
their families. 
Another major objective of UWSHR is to raise funds for projects and 
agencies in the local community. The organization has made a significant 
impact on the local community, and in return it has received a great amount 
of support from its donors. The facts and figures that follow illustrate this 
support by detailing the 2013-14 United Way Campaign to raise funds for 
its member agencies and programs. 
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The 2013-14 United Way 
Of South Hampton Roads 
Campaign
$13.7 million in gifts were received. These donations came 
from:
• $3.2 million came from 200 donors giving $10,000 or more 
• $2.4 million came from 1,500 donors giving $1,000 to $9,999
• $1.7 million came from 3,000 donors giving $475 to $999
• $2.9 million came from 33,300 donors giving less than $475
•  16 accounts generated 50 percent of funds for the campaign. The largest 
company campaigns, in order of total amount raised: 
1. Sentara Healthcare 
2. Norfolk Southern 
3. Pilot Media 
4. GEICO 
5. PRA Group 
6. Dominion Power 
7. Dominion Enterprises 
8. Virginia Beach City Public Schools 
9. TowneBank 
10. Wells Fargo 
11. City of Virginia Beach 
12. Bank of America 
13. USAA 
14. Christian Broadcasting Network 
15. SunTrust 
16. City of Norfolk 
17. Checkered Flag Motor Car Co.
•  82 accounts raised $25,000 to $149,999 each (27 percent of the 
campaign)
•  498 accounts raised less than $25,000 each (12 percent of the 
campaign)
•  50 percent of the contributions were designated by donors to specific 
agencies or projects
•  30 percent were allocated by 63 volunteers that spent almost 1,200 hours 
reviewing financials, budgets and agency programs 
•  13 percent were allocated to overhead costs for administration and 
fundraising (the Better Business Bureau says a well-run charity stays under 
35 percent of overhead costs) 
•  7 percent were designated to special programs
United Way of the Virginia Peninsula is independent of United 
Way of South Hampton Roads, but holds similar goals and 
has similar achievements of which it can boast. It is roughly 
one-half the size of the South Hampton Roads version.   
Number of individuals employed - 11
Number of volunteers - 44
Contributions and grants - $6,006,358
Investment income - $261,004
Total revenue - $6,542,524
Grants and similar accounts paid - $5,065,390
Salaries, compensation, employee benefits - $763,376
Other expenses - $622,524
Total expenses - $6,451,290
Total assets - $9,382,634
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Community impact:
•  Funding from the 2013-14 UWSHR helped its certified agencies support 
more than 195,000 people in Hampton Roads. Of these:
°  128,167 were rescued during emergencies, such as abusive situations 
and homelessness  
°  40,295 were children and families receiving school tutoring or child 
care and programs to reinforce positive behaviors
°  17,214 disabled, elderly and sick individuals received health services, 
education and support
• Nearly $1 million was used to fund early childhood programs.
CERTIFIED AGENCIES OF UWSHR
Sixty-six health and human services nonprofits have become “certified” 
agencies of UWSHR. To qualify, agencies undergo an extensive external 
review of their financials, audits and results by a panel of local volunteers, 
including corporate executives, community leaders and subject-matter 
experts.  
The United Way’s review of funding candidates is 
unquestionably laudable; however, the consensus in the 
charitable world is that analogous programs need to be in 
place to provide additional ongoing monitoring and guidance 
for existing charitable organizations that have long been 
around. Such organizations can get stuck in a rut operationally 
and lose their energy and efficiency. It is not easy to scrutinize 
existing charities, but it is an important task that directly 
affects the eventual impact of the United Way.  
Once a nonprofit organization has been certified, UWSHR partners with the 
organization to bring resources together to address complex social issues in 
the local area. Figure 1 shows the diversity and geographical spread of the 
United Way’s certified agencies in the South Hampton Roads region.
The impact of UWSHR’s 66 member agencies on the local community is 
impressive. Member organizations provide a range of services that include 
domestic violence shelters, literacy support to the homeless, dental care to 
the uninsured, child care, services for senior citizens, youth development, 
programs to empower girls to become leaders and legal assistance to low-
income residents, among others. United Way-funded programs offered by 
these organizations serve nearly 200,000 clients.  
In total, these member agencies have 367 different programs targeted 
toward helping people. They employ 8,301 individuals across the 
region. Revenues for all member organizations combined in 2013 totaled 
$389,950,614, of which $108,210,527 was collected from fees for 
services offered by programs of the member organizations. Out-of-market 
revenues (revenues brought in from outside Hampton Roads) totaled 
$37,453,572, a remarkable amount of funding coming to the area. A 
breakdown of organizational statistics of the 66 member agencies is 
provided in Table 5. Note that in the column titled “Total Number of Clients 
Served,” an asterisk indicates whether those individuals were served by 
programs funded directly by the United Way.
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FIGURE 1
UNITED WAY OF SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS PARTNER AGENCIES
Source: http://unitedwayshr.org/content/tl_files/unitedwayshr/2014%20Campaign/ComSolutionsWrap-WEB-map.png
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TABLE 5
UNITED WAY OF SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS, 2013





Total Number of 
Clients Served
ACCESS Aids Care 40  $2,943,724     406
Access Partnership 5  $272,380     1,638
Armed Services YMCA of 
Hampton Roads
14  $1,433,509     6,206*
Beach Health Clinic 7  $1,130,391     1,750*
Boys & Girls Clubs of Southeast 
Virginia
120  $1,789,494     2,700*
Catholic Charities of Eastern 
Virginia
47  $2,092,217 $57,759  $413,474   3,430*
Cerebral Palsy of Virginia 8  $415,340    $48,523 381
Chesapeake Service Systems 84  $6,750,214     275
Children’s Harbor 89  $4,694,224     620*
CHIP of Hampton Roads 24  $1,237,030 $617,872  $11,757 2,177
Colonial Virginia Council, Boy 
Scouts of America
9  $1,339,282    $823,479 916
Edmarc 14  $1,095,461     225
Eggleston 559  $22,365,027     485*
EQUI-KIDS 25  $1,058,216     131
Foodbank of Southeastern Virginia 58  $31,169,081     19,400*
ForKids 79  $5,282,363 $1,920,341  $52,127 174*
Friends of the Portsmouth Juvenile 
Court
3  $136,062     257
Girl Scout Council of Colonial 
Coast
61  $4,494,000    $338,934 10,059*
Girls Inc. of Greater Peninsula 22  $1,339,706     172*
Goodwill Industries of Central and 
Coastal Virginia
1,184 $51,621,345 $307,216  $2,629,727 1,780
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TABLE 5
UNITED WAY OF SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS, 2013





Total Number of 
Clients Served
Habitat for Humanity of South 
Hampton Roads
14  $3,304,527     31
Help and Emergency Response 19  $745,009     543*
Hope House Foundation 247  $7,516,544  $205,170  $6,839,248 123
Horizons Hampton Roads 85  $962,760  $43,819  $8,830 358
Ida Barbour Early Learning Center 15  $436,499    $271,274 97*
Isle of Wight Christian Outreach 
Program
0  $460,775     16,500*
Jewish Family Service of Tidewater 204  $7,532,702  $243,962  $6,514,191 2,823*
Judeo-Christian Outreach Center 15  $971,139     2,690*
Kirk-Cone Rehabilitation 0  $46,516     492
Lee’s Friends 3  $246,965     196
Legal Aid Society of Eastern 
Virginia
36  $3,216,432     718*
Marilyn and Marvin Simon Family 
Jewish Community Center
133  $3,143,827  $2,132,736   571*
Meals on Wheels of Chesapeake 2  $145,162  $4,000  $79,141 100*
Meals on Wheels of Portsmouth 1  $111,023     64
Portsmouth Area Resources 
Coalition
14  $951,847  $383,886   401*
Peninsula Metropolitan YMCA 1,067  $19,188,688  $692,680  $16,090,090 1,610*
PrimePlus 22  $720,078  $198,545  $224,705 1,464*
Reading Enriches All Children 
(REACH)
2  $132,661  $2,792   613
Samaritan House 34  $2,368,718  $806,319   1,157*
Senior Services of Southeastern 
Virginia
102  $6,882,755  $6,078,638  $412,918 2,135*
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TABLE 5
UNITED WAY OF SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS, 2013





Total Number of 
Clients Served
Seton Youth Shelters 48  $1,262,556     5,008*
Southside Boys and Girls Club 21  $690,148  $65,140  $191,377 761*
St. Mary’s Home for Disabled 
Children
286  $16,227,909  $14,250  $15,299,713 38
The Children’s Center 214  $6,803,897  $792,291  $6,014,538 1,033*
The Genieve Shelter 8  $392,436     210*
The Planning Council 68  $17,483,313  $16,049,878  $147,877 31,799*
The Salvation Army Hampton 
Roads Area Command
86  $10,598,026  $486,327  $7,980 31,722*
The Salvation Army, Portsmouth 2  $1,017,067     5,400*
The Salvation Army, Suffolk 7  $2,226,795     5,637*
The Up Center 179  $14,522,119  $1,452,914  $11,444,180 2,807*
Tidewater Council, Boy Scouts of 
America 
14  $1,956,434     11,496*
Urban League of Hampton Roads 26  $1,455,092     1,505*
USO of Hampton Roads and 
Central Virginia
19  $1,723,195  $1,585,250   390
Virginia Supportive Housing 43  $8,655,810    $1,641,758 343
Volunteer Hampton Roads 5  $405,756  $10,000  $93,000 101*
Volunteers of America 
Chesapeake - Virginia Beach 
Lighthouse Center
12  $32,220,437     100*
Wesley Community Service Center 5  $165,226    $1,260 852*
Western Tidewater Free Clinic 25  $1,579,542     1,206*
WHRO 137  $13,759,725     1,500*
William A. Hunton YMCA 33  $1,095,582  $122,525  $689,197 1,820*
YMCA of Portsmouth 178  $2,546,450  $2,001,418  $7,500 900*
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TABLE 5
UNITED WAY OF SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS, 2013





Total Number of 
Clients Served
YMCA of South Hampton Roads 2,341  $49,160,804  $224,909  $37,857,845 1,800*
YWCA South Hampton Roads 77  $2,258,602  $952,936  $469,358 688*
TOTAL 8,301  $389,950,614  $37,453,572  $108,210,527 192,984
Source: United Way of South Hampton Roads
It is clear that UWSHR plays an integral role in the Hampton Roads 
community via the programs it funds. The number of people assisted by the 
United Way is higher than many might expect. Table 6 reports the number of 
individuals helped by United Way programs for the purposes of child care 
or tutoring, assistance during emergencies or crises, meals distributed in the 
community, and assistance to the disabled, elderly or sick.  
Residents of Virginia Beach and Norfolk typically receive the most assistance 
from the UWSHR organizations in each of the four categories in Table 6. 
Of note is the large number of meals distributed by United Way-certified 
agencies – 7.7 million meals in Norfolk and Virginia Beach alone.
Final Observations
The impact of the nonprofit sector in Hampton Roads often is overlooked. 
However, nonprofit organizations increase the quality of life in our 
region even as they reduce economic inequality. Without our nonprofit 
organizations, and specifically, without the United Way, Hampton Roads 
would be a far less attractive place to reside.
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TABLE 6
COMMUNITY IMPACT OF UWSHR-CERTIFIED MEMBER AGENCIES
Number of Children 
in Child Care/Tutoring 
Programs
Number of Individuals 
Helped During 
Emergencies
Number of Meals 
Distributed to Individuals
Number of Disabled, 
Elderly or Sick that 
Received Services
Virginia Beach 16,907 30,823 3.6 million 5,334
Norfolk 15,538 31,997 4.1 million 4,379
Chesapeake 8,334 14,997 1.9 million 2,018
Western Tidewater 5,229 31,663 1.6 million 2,473
Portsmouth 4,168 18,267 1.1 million 3,010
Total 50, 176 127,747 12.3 million 17,214
Source: http://unitedwayshr.org/content/index.php/392.html

Early Childhood Care And 
Education: Should They 
Be Our No. 1 Economic 
Development Strategy? 
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EARLY CHILDHOOD CARE AND EDUCATION: SHOULD THEY BE 
OUR NO. 1 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY?
Pay me now or pay me later. 
– The prophetic words from a well-known 1970s television commercial
S
omewhat unexpectedly, early childhood care, education and development are becoming hot topics in the economic development arena. Compared 
to more conventional approaches to promote economic development that involve tax incentives and attempts to attract 
businesses, investments in early childhood programs constitute a superior development strategy in terms of societal benefits 
received per dollar spent. As a consequence, the time has come to consider investments in early childhood programs as a 
legitimate and viable approach to stimulate economic growth in Hampton Roads.   
In the past decade alone, early childhood development has attracted the 
attention of numerous high-profile economists, including Nobel laureate and 
University of Chicago professor, James Heckman; former chair of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Ben Bernanke; and president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Jeffrey Lacker.1 The Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis considers the topic important enough to devote 
a “Special Study” section of its website to disseminating early childhood 
research.2
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the issues and evidence 
concerning early childhood development programs in Hampton Roads. We’ll 
examine the economic “nuts and bolts” of early childhood effectiveness and 
also survey the child care options that exist in Hampton Roads. We’ll close 
by exploring the challenges ahead and offer a few suggestions to enhance 
early childhood programs and participation. 
1  Ben Bernanke, “Early Childhood Education.” Speech at the Children’s Defense Fund National Conference, 
Cincinnati. July 24, 2012. Jeffrey Lacker, Early Childhood Development and Economic Growth. Governor’s 
Summit on Early Childhood Development, Richmond. July 27, 2007. 
2 www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/special-studies/early-childhood-development.
The Economics Of 
Early Childhood Programs
Both formal and informal education and training fall under a single umbrella 
that economists refer to as “human capital” – all of the talents, abilities, 
knowledge and drive that people possess. The more human capital an 
individual, region or state possesses, the better that individual, region or 
state is likely to be at producing goods and services, generating innovations 
and producing income. For most individuals, their human capital 
usually is one of the strongest predictors of their current 
and future economic productivity, which in turn is one of the 
strongest predictors of their earnings and overall economic 
well-being. 
Job training programs and formal schooling are the usual ways utilized to 
increase the quantity and quality of our human capital. However, so are 
early childhood education and intervention, which together turn out to be 
one of the most cost-effective methods for developing human capital and 
promoting economic development.
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A seminal study of the impact of a high-quality early childhood education 
program was the Abecedarian Project, in which four cohorts of children 
born between 1972 and 1977 were randomly assigned as infants either to 
the early education intervention group or a control group. The progress of 
the children was monitored over time and follow-up studies were conducted 
at ages 12, 15 and 21. Long-lasting benefits accrued to those children in 
the early education intervention group. Over the course of their academic 
careers, the children who attended preschool completed more years of 
education and were more likely to attend a four-year university than were 
their peers who did not attend preschool. The group that attended preschool 
was found to have lower rates of teen pregnancy, violence, crime and 
overall economic dependence.3
While research has shown that the benefit per dollar invested – 
the rate of return on investment (ROI) – varies with the specific 
type of early childhood intervention, there is now widespread 
agreement that early childhood programs are also an excellent 
economic investment for the broader community. Graph 1 shows 
Heckman’s comparative estimates of the ROI on various programs and job 
training for different age ranges. Note that early childhood programs boast 
ROIs about three times as large as conventional job training programs.
Heckman found that the first five years of a child’s life are critical to 
developing the foundation for the cognitive and character skills one will 
need to achieve economic success later in life. Since various studies have 
demonstrated the fact that ROIs on postsecondary education investments 
have been declining, there is now a strong argument for shifting 
resources away from later-in-life job training programs and 
redirecting them to early childhood programs. 
A practical political problem, however, is that many of the 
benefits that flow from preschool programs and interventions 
often are deferred and do not appear immediately. Elected 
officials who require visible, immediate feedback and results 
may be too impatient to wait for these advantages to appear.  
3  F.A. Campbell, et al. (2002). “Early childhood education: Young adult outcomes from the Abecedarian 
Project.”  Applied Developmental Science, 6, 42-57.
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GRAPH 1 
COMPARATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE RETURN ON INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 
Source: James J. Heckman (2008). “Schools, Skills and Synapses,” Economic Inquiry, 46(3), 289-324
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The Perry 
Preschool Project
We can glean some valuable information on precisely how these early 
childhood returns materialize by examining data from the well-known Perry 
Preschool Project. This project began in Ypsilanti, Mich., in the 1960s. It 
randomly divided 3- and 4-year-old children into two groups: One group 
was provided free access to part-time preschool and a home visit by 
each student’s teacher every week, while the other control group did not 
receive the preschool program. The Perry study collected information on all 
participants annually between the ages of 3 and 11 and again at ages 14, 
15, 19, 27 and 40.
One would expect children who received the additional preschooling to 
receive some benefits while in the program (and they did); however, the 
benefits had lasting effects at every age point through age 40. 
At age 40, for example, the preschool group was less likely to have been 
arrested, less likely to have experienced teen pregnancies, less likely to have 
received government assistance, more likely to have graduated high school, 
more likely to have higher earnings and more likely to have better health. 
Graph 2 provides a detailed breakdown of the costs and the benefits of the 
Perry Project (all numbers have been expressed in 2014-equivalent incomes 
and prices).  
The cost per pupil of the Perry project – in 2014 dollars – was 
a bit more than $21,000. Through age 40 for each of the 
participants, preschool program participants were less costly to 
educate over their lifetimes (a savings of $10,182), less likely 
to be on public assistance (a savings of $3,859), less likely to 
commit crimes and be part of the criminal justice system (a 
savings of $239,079), and they paid more in taxes ($19,628).  
The criminal justice savings ($239,079) associated with preschool programs 
is almost breathtakingly large. Plainly speaking, it derives primarily from 
students in preschool programs staying out of jail. It is expensive to lock up 
individuals. 
One must compare these salutary results with the much less impressive 
outcomes that are generated by conventional business subsidies (usually tax 
incentives) that governmental units at all levels habitually utilize in hopes of 
improving their economic situations. In the 2014 State of the Region report, 
we catalogued these studies in detail and so it will suffice for us to note 
here that in general, tax incentives yield low returns for cities and counties 
that rely upon them, and typically yield negative returns for regions and 
states because of the competitive bidding process that firms use to wring 
out maximum benefits from their potential hosts. Two studies conducted by 
JLARC, Virginia’s Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee, concluded 
that tax incentives had very mixed effectiveness (JLARC, “Review of the 
Effectiveness of Virginia Tax Preferences,” 2012; “Review of State Economic 
Development Incentive Grants,” 2012).  
The first study observed that the state’s tax preferences were quite expensive: 
“Tax preferences collectively reduced taxpayers’ liability by approximately 
$12.5 billion in tax year 2008, which represents nearly 90 percent of the 
amount of State revenue collected from the tax systems reviewed ($14.3 
billion).” However, the study concluded the effects were “mixed.” The 
second study concluded that 80 percent of firms that received economic 
development incentive grants would have chosen the same site they 
eventually chose even if they had received no grant.
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GRAPH 2
PERRY PRESCHOOL PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS (IN 2014 DOLLARS)








Source: “The High/Scope Perry Pre-school Study Through Age 40: Summary, Conclusions, and Frequently Asked Questions,” 
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Education Savings Taxes on Earnings Welfare Savings Crime Savings 
$12.90 is the eventual public return per pupil per dollar 
invested, which translates to a 7 percent to 10 percent ROI after 
the future financial returns have been appropriately discounted. 
Total Public Benefit  
$272,748 
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The Early Childhood 
Landscape In Virginia And 
Hampton Roads 
Though virtually all children benefit from quality preschool programming, 
high-risk children from lower socioeconomic statuses benefit the most. This 
is important to Hampton Roads because we have large numbers of high-risk 
children living in the region. Table 1 shows the percentage of children under 
age 6 in each community who were living below the U.S. government-
designated poverty level and 200 percent of that poverty level in 2013 
(the most recent year that data are available for small geographic areas).
Although one out of every five children under age 6 in Hampton Roads was 
living below the poverty level in 2013 (more than 26,000 children total), the 
percentages vary considerably from community to community. The Peninsula 
communities of Poquoson, York County, Williamsburg and Gloucester 
County have the lowest percentage of at-risk children. 
By way of contrast, communities such as Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, 
Portsmouth and Mathews County have much higher percentages at risk. In 
fact, if we extend the threshold to 200 percent of the poverty 
level, then more than one-half of all children under age 6 
are at high risk in Newport News, Norfolk, Portsmouth and 
Mathews County. According to a 2014 report by the Weldon Cooper 
Center, more than 60 percent of Virginia’s children living in single-parent 
families and 50 percent of children in cohabiting-parent families live in or 
near poverty. Contrast these numbers to the 20 percent of children living 
at or near poverty levels in married-parent families.4 This is one of the 
reasons why society has strong reasons for encouraging married, two-parent 
families.
4  www.coopercenter.org/demographics/childhood-poverty-in-Virginia.
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TABLE 1
AT-RISK CHILDREN IN HAMPTON ROADS COMMUNITIES, 2013
Percentage of Children Under Age 6 at or 
Below Poverty Line
($23,550 or less for a family of four)
Percentage of Children Under Age 6 at or 
Below 200 Percent of Poverty Line
($47,100 or less for a family of four)
Chesapeake 12.9% 34.6%
Hampton 25.2% 49.3%





Virginia Beach 14.7% 37.2%
Williamsburg 7.6% 40.0%
Gloucester County 9.2% 40.1%
Isle of Wight County 26.8% 43.3%
James City County 18.1% 31.1%
Mathews County 48.6% 77.2%
York County 5.8% 25.5%
Hampton Roads Total 20.6% 43.8%
Source: Calculations made from the 2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table B17024
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As a consequence, many Hampton Roads children begin their 
formal education at a distinct disadvantage that often turns out 
to be long lasting. Children who begin kindergarten behind 
their peers rarely close the gap. Rather, the gap widens throughout 
their education, placing them at risk for undesirable outcomes, including not 
being promoted, dropping out of school, not attending college, and being 
unemployed. These negative outcomes on the individual level become even 
more troubling when one considers the cumulative costs that these results 
impose on the broader community.
Child care is one way to diminish the differences that otherwise might exist 
between and among preschool children. In Virginia, from a regulatory 
standpoint, there are three child care options: (1) licensed; (2) regulated/
unlicensed; and (3) unregulated/unlicensed. Table 2 presents the number 
and types of facilities in each community in Hampton Roads.
Licensed child care facilities must meet the standards set forth by the State 
Board of Social Services. These facilities differ from others in terms of how 
they operate. There are three major varieties of licensed child care facilities. 
A child care center is a regularly operating service arrangement for children 
where, during the absence of a parent or guardian, that center has agreed 
to assume responsibility for the supervision, protection and well-being of a 
child under the age of 13 for less than a 24-hour period. Short-term centers 
operate during only part of the year, while family day homes may provide 
care for six to 12 children (exclusive of the provider’s own children and any 
children who reside in the home). The care may be offered in the home of 
the provider or in the home of any of the children in care.
However, as Table 2 reveals, the largest single category of 
child care facilities in Hampton Roads consists of facilities that 
are unlicensed by the Commonwealth. These facilities, numbering 
almost 600, may be unlicensed because they have opted for a religious 
exemption, or they may be operating in an otherwise accredited private 
school (called a certified Pre-K facility), or they may be providing care in a 
private home with fewer than six children. 
There is no single source of reliable data that informs us how many children 
are cared for in unregulated/unlicensed child care environments, such as 
extended family or family friend care. A recent Washington Post report 
noted that nine children died in unregulated day care homes in Virginia 
in 2014, making it the deadliest year for child care environments in the 
past decade.5 In addition to potential safety concerns, the quality of the 
educational curriculum, teacher-child interactions and teacher qualifications 
can be a matter of concern in such instances. 
5  www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/nine-va-children-died-in-unregulated-day-care-in-2014-the-
deadliest-year-in-a-decade/2014/12/30/bf302040-8161-11e4-81fd-8c4814dfa9d7_story.html.
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TABLE 2




Child Day Center Family Day Home
Short-Term Child Day 
Center
Religious Exempt, 
Certified Pre-K and 
Voluntary Registered 
Day Homes
Chesapeake 62 27 4 100
Hampton 28 12 2 55
Newport News 67 2 1 50
Norfolk 79 17 5 131
Poquoson 3 0 0 2
Portsmouth 27 15 0 54
Suffolk 27 5 1 33
Virginia Beach 102 28 2 105
Williamsburg 3 0 0 5
Gloucester County 7 1 0 7
Isle of Wight County 12 3 0 5
James City County 25 2 0 10
Mathews County 3 0 0 3
York County 23 4 0 11
Hampton Roads 468 116 15 571
Source: Virginia Department of Social Services website, www.dss.virginia.gov (accessed March 23, 2015)
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Accreditation
In an effort to demonstrate quality beyond basic health and safety 
regulations, the National Association for the Education of Young Children 
(NAEYC) has developed child care accreditation standards and Virginia’s 
Star Quality Initiative represents a voluntary system of center rating that 
has higher standards and expectations than state licensing regulations. 
The theory is that quality in early childhood settings makes a difference in 
outcomes. This is a reasonable supposition, but there is comparatively little 
evidence available on this issue other than the “child care versus no child 
care” dichotomy. Quality is not easy to measure.
This has led to attempts to measure quality according to specific standards. 
In Virginia, a QRIS (Quality Rating and Improvement System) exists that 
operates on a voluntary basis. Each participating preschool, child care 
program or family child care home is assigned a star rating that ranges 
from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). The star rating system examines four standard 
areas: 1) education, qualifications and training; 2) interactions; 3) structure; 
and 4) instruction. Currently, there are 89 star-rated child care centers and 
29 star-rated family child care homes in operation within Hampton Roads. 
The communities in which these facilities operate are shown in Table 3.
On a national scale, the largest professional organization of early childhood 
educators is the National Association for the Education of Young Children. 
NAEYC accreditation of programs for young children represents the 
benchmark of quality in early childhood education. Accreditation began in 
1985 with the goal of providing an accrediting system that would raise the 
level of early childhood programs. Today, more than 6,500 programs are 
NAEYC-accredited. NAEYC-accredited programs in Virginia include private 
child care, Head Start and military-affiliated child care programs. Virginia 
has a total of 134 NAEYC-accredited programs, 29 of which are located in 
Hampton Roads.
The relatively small number of quality-rated or nationally accredited child 
care options in Hampton Roads may be a cause for concern for families 
wanting to place their children in environments that have been evaluated 
for program quality using robust measures. Mandatory participation would 
supply decision makers, especially parents, with valuable information. 
However, as just noted, the link between apparent measures of quality and 
outcomes has not been firmly established.  
TABLE 3













Virginia Beach 16 3
Williamsburg 9 0
Gloucester County 0 0
Isle of Wight County 0 0
James City County 0 0
Mathews County 1 0
York County 1 1
Source: QRIS website, http://qrisnetwork.org
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Early Childhood And 
Preschool Teachers
By Virginia statute, being a “program leader” is the minimum standard to 
be considered a child care teacher. Program leaders are individuals who 
are designated to be responsible for the direct supervision of children and 
for implementation of the activities and services for a group of children. 
Program leaders may also be referred to as child care supervisors, or as 
teachers, must be at least 18 years of age, have completed a high school 
program or the equivalent, and have six months of supervised programmatic 
experience. Classroom aides must be at least 16 years of age.6  
It may be confusing to the uninitiated, but the minimal qualifications just 
cited are not the same as those for teachers working in classrooms receiving 
Virginia Preschool Initiative (Commonwealth) funding. At present, Virginia’s 
VPI guidelines do not specify education and licensure requirements, though 
school division administrators may strive to hire teachers with Virginia state 
Pre-K-3 or Pre-K-6 teaching licenses to lead classrooms. 
Participation And Challenges
Anyone who has ever relied on either formal or informal child care services 
knows how expensive these services can be. According to a 2014 report 
from Child Care Aware, the average annual cost of caring for an infant in 
a Virginia child care center was $10,028, which was just 3 percent less 
than the average annual cost of tuition and fees at a public college in the 
Commonwealth.7 For many families in Hampton Roads, private, center-
based infant care is not an affordable option. The children most at risk in
6  http://nrckids.org/default/assets/File/StateRegs/VA/StandardsforLicensedChildDayCenters.pdf.
7  Child Care Aware of America (2014). Parents and the High Cost of Child Care: 2014 Report. 
www.arizonachildcare.org/pdf/2014-child-care-cost-report.pdf. See Appendix VI.
our region (those living at or below the poverty level) more than likely must 
rely on publicly funded preschool programs, such as the VPI and Head Start, 
for their programming.8
Virginia’s VPI programs began in 1996 and are designed to serve at-risk 
4-year-old children. Primary funding responsibility for the program is shared 
by the Commonwealth and local school district and assumes a per-pupil 
cost of $6,000. School districts, if they choose to participate, 
are allocated “slots” based on factors such as the number of 
4-year-olds in their community, the number of students eligible 
for free lunch and the district’s Head Start enrollment.  
Beginning in 2016, children in Hampton Roads will be eligible for the 
VPI if their family income is less than 200 percent of the poverty line 
(or 350 percent for children with special needs or disabilities), they are 
homeless, or their parents or guardians dropped out of school. In 2014-
15, the VPI program served more than 18,000 children statewide and the 
Commonwealth’s share of funding exceeded $68 million.
Table 4 reports the apparent number of eligible students, the number of VPI 
slots allocated by the Commonwealth and the number and percentage of 
unused VPI slots.  
Unlike the attendance figures, the use of VPI slots in Hampton Roads varies 
widely from school district to school district. Although our region’s average 
usage of allocated slots (88.2 percent) far exceeds the statewide average of 
69.4 percent, local figures vary from a low of 0 percent in Mathews County 
to a high of 100 percent in Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, Portsmouth, 
Suffolk and Williamsburg-James City County. To date, Mathews County has 
chosen not to participate in the VPI, even though it has been allocated six 
slots.  
8  T. Halle, et al. (2011). “Setting the context for a discussion of quality measures: The demographic 
landscape of early care and education,” pp. 3-10 in I. Martinez-Beck et al., Quality Measurement in Early 
Childhood Settings. Paul H. Brookes Publishing Company.
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TABLE 4
PRESCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND VIRGINIA PRESCHOOL INITIATIVE (VPI) SLOTS AND USAGE, 2012-2013
Percentage of Children 
Age 5 and Under in Any 
Preschool
Number of VPI Slots 
Allocated
Percentage of VPI 
Slots Used
Number of Unused Slots
Chesapeake 24.3% 537 56.6% 233
Hampton 24.7% 617 100.0% 0
Newport News 22.4% 1,157 100.0% 0
Norfolk 22.5% 1,827 100.0% 0
Poquoson 34.0% 10 20.0% 8
Portsmouth 30.9% 619 100.0% 0
Suffolk 26.2% 402 100.0% 0
Virginia Beach 23.4% 1,078 65.3% 374
Gloucester County 29.4% 38 47.4% 20
Isle of Wight County 26.2% 189 47.6% 99
Williamsburg - James City County 22.5% 85 100.0% 0
Mathews County 24.5% 6 0.0% 6
York County 20.5% 55 29.1% 39
Hampton Roads Total 24.3% 6,620 88.2% 779
Virginia Total 25.1% 24,483 69.4% 7,498
Sources: 2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates Tables B14001, S0101, and Virginia’s Biennial School Readiness Report Card: 2013
Head Start is probably the most well-known early childhood initiative because it has existed since 1965. Its principal function is to 
provide comprehensive early childhood services to (primarily) low-income children up to age 5. Nationally, and within Hampton 
Roads, Head Start centers are heavily dependent on federal funding to operate. During the 2013-14 year, the federal government 
provided more than 99 percent of the more than $7 million in Head Start funding received in Hampton Roads. In terms of services, 
seven Head Start facilities on the Peninsula reported serving 447 children, while the 15 Southside facilities reported assisting 875 
children (for a total of 1,322). 
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Final Thoughts
Unfortunately, where economic development strategies are concerned, we 
live in a “what have you done for me lately” world. The lure of new arenas, 
hotels and performance venues tends to trump investments in preschool 
programs and interventions, even though the available empirical evidence 
shows that preschool investments generate higher rates of return (ROI) on 
scarce investment dollars.  
There are three reasons for this. First, the time horizon attached 
to preschool investments apparently is too long for elected 
officials. Preschool investments simply don’t pay off quickly 
enough to satisfy many, perhaps most, elected officials.  
Second, preschool investment advocates don’t have the 
political clout of those interested in large bricks-and-mortar 
developments, and they seldom make the critical political 
contributions that lubricate American democracy.  
Third, by and large, elected officials believe they are making 
the right decision when they invest in arenas, hotels and 
performance venues. Regrettably, this is because they are 
substantially uninformed, even ignorant, of the evidence on 
early childhood education and what the ROIs are for each of 
the alternative investment choices in front of them. Getting their 
attention in order to have an opportunity to inform them is a major challenge 
because, almost daily, they interact with innumerable groups of constituents 
pushing one agenda or another. Some of these groups are well placed and 
well funded.  
The stakes, however, are huge. If we wish to jolt Hampton 
Roads upward from its current low economic growth pattern, 
then we must do things differently. A very important place 
to start – perhaps the most important place to start – is 
increasing our regional investment in preschool programs and 
interventions. 
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Is Hampton Roads Facing A 
Shortage Of Nurses?
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IS HAMPTON ROADS FACING A SHORTAGE OF NURSES?
F
ew events grab our attention like the threat of an impending crisis. Documented claims that we (as a nation) will be facing a nursing shortage date as far 
back as the 1930s and seemingly reappear every few decades. The concern is so pervasive that it is easy to find scores of reports, news articles and 
proposed legislation, even a Wikipedia entry, on the topic. 
The current arguments in support of a coming shortage are centered on 
changing demographics, a wave of nurse retirements, the recently passed 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the improving economy and 
nursing schools unable to train enough nurses to fill the gaps. In short, the 
aging population and increased insurance coverage are going to massively 
increase demand, while retirements and an improving economy reduce the 
supply as nursing schools struggle to make up the difference. This is all true, 
but the sky is not likely to fall. 
In this chapter, we assess the future of the Hampton Roads nursing workforce 
by examining the local supply and demand for nurses. As you will see, 
Hampton Roads is reasonably well positioned for the future as long as we 
maintain our current level of hiring and training of nurses. We will also 
present suggestions based on experience and the research of industry 
analysts about how to secure our position, given the coming changes.
Background
For this chapter, a “nurse” is synonymous with a “registered nurse,”  
“professional nurse” or “RN.” If any other nurse occupation is considered, 
it will be referred to by its official title/abbreviation (e.g., licensed practical 
nurse or LPN, nursing assistant or NA).
We rely on two sources for information concerning the nursing profession: 
the Virginia Department of Health Professions (DHP) and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS). The DHP administers a relatively new annual survey 
of nurses renewing their license in Virginia. License renewal is completed 
every two years, so for any given year only half of the nurses will be eligible 
to complete the survey. More than 80 percent of nurses who are eligible 
do respond to the survey, providing an excellent look into our regional 
workforce. The BLS administers the Occupation Employment Survey, a 
semiannual nationwide survey that is conducted with state employment 
agencies. For the Virginia workforce, the DHP data are likely to be more 
reliable since the department has access to all registered nurses, whereas 
the BLS uses a random sample of individuals. We can use DHP data for 
comparing and describing Virginia, Hampton Roads, Richmond and 
Northern Virginia, but for descriptions of any other metropolitan areas, BLS 
data will need to be used. Any difference among the sources is likely due 
to the difference in access rather than methodology. We use the DHP data 
as often as possible but rely on the BLS data to capture and project broader 
national trends in the nursing workforce.
A registered nurse is a person whom the Virginia Board of Nursing deems 
qualified to provide “professional nursing service.” The key qualifications 
are the successful completion of an approved degree or diploma program 
and the passage of a board-approved competency exam. The BLS lists 
typical nurses’ duties as recording patient medical data, 
performing diagnostic tests, administering medicines and 
equipment, establishing and implementing care plans, and 
explaining to patients their treatments. Registered nurses 
typically work under the direction of physicians. Two similar 
professionals are the licensed practical nurse, who mostly monitors patients 
and provides basic care, and the nursing assistant, who performs the most 
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basic duties. The three professions can and often do work in the same 
facility, but RNs are more likely to work in a hospital, while the other two 
are primarily in long-term-care facilities. When they are in the same facility, 
LPNs and NAs typically work under the direction of an RN. 
There are three pathways to becoming a registered nurse. The most 
common path is a four-year bachelor’s degree, followed by a two-year 
associate degree and, lastly, a hospital-based diploma program. There are 
approximately 80 nursing programs in the Commonwealth, but currently 
only Riverside Health System, based in Newport News, operates a nursing 
diploma program. Hampton Roads has five baccalaureate and eight 
associate degree programs in addition to the Riverside diploma program.
The composition of degrees varies by area, as shown in Table 1. 
Interestingly, Northern Virginia has the most educated nursing workforce, 
while Hampton Roads features the smallest percentage of advanced nursing 
degrees and the highest percentage of diploma degrees (rightly or wrongly, 
considered a lower education level). The smaller percentage of advanced 
degrees in our region is a potential concern because advanced degree 
holders are often the instructors of future nurses. By having (relatively) fewer 
advanced-degree nurses, we may be constraining our region’s ability to 
supply nurses in the future. 
In 2014, Virginia employed approximately 73,038 registered 
nurses in either part- or full-time positions. Accounting for 
the hours worked by nurses, the Commonwealth had about 
72,089 “full-time-equivalency units” of nurses in 2014. This 
measure adjusts for part-time and overtime hours to count 
how many full-time workers would be employed if everyone 
worked a standard 40-hour week for 50 weeks. Hampton 
Roads employed around 15,514 nurses and had about 14,396 
FTEs, which represents approximately 20 percent of the state’s 
nurse workforce. As can be seen in Table 2, Northern Virginia employs 
the most nurses, but fewer nurses work full time compared to Hampton 
Roads and Richmond. 
In Virginia, about half of the nurses work in hospitals, with the rest 
distributed relatively evenly in other environments. Most nurses, 85 percent, 
work in metropolitan areas, which matches the 88 percent of Virginians 
living in metro areas. Over 90 percent of nurses are female, 
roughly one-third are non-white and the median age is 48. The 
nursing workforce in Hampton Roads is more racially diverse 
than other metro areas, which is likely due to the military’s 
influence. 
From the BLS survey, the 2014 median annual income for 
nurses is $62,610 for Virginia, $60,540 for Hampton Roads, 
$63,770 for Richmond and $74,680 for the entire Washington, 
D.C., metropolitan area. The average median income across 
all metro areas is $64,119. Northern Virginia nurses may be paid 
more because of cost of living and their higher education level, despite the 
TABLE 1
WORKFORCE CHARACTERISTICS OF REGISTERED NURSES IN 







Hospital RN Diploma 13.2 19.3 7.0 16.7
Associate Degree 33.9 30.1 28.3 34.0
Bachelor’s Degree 40.0 39.0 49.0 36.1
Master’s + Doctorate 12.6 11.4 15.5 12.8
RN Education from VA 71.6 70.4 53.2 77.6
Under 40 w/ 
Debt Education
58.3 67.8 53.8 61.6
Wants to Pursue 
More Education
37.9 42.3 36.4 39.2
Diversity Index 35 50 43 35
Percent Non-white 20 32 33 23
Female 93 94 94 94
Source: VA DHP, VA Healthcare Workforce Data Center, *as of February 2014
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fact that fewer work full time. Across Virginia, almost two-thirds of nurses 
are hourly-wage workers, slightly less than one-third are salaried and the 
rest have other arrangements (e.g., contractual, self-employed, volunteer, 
etc.). About two-thirds of nurses receive health care through their work and 
a similar percentage receives retirement benefits. More than 90 percent of 
nurses report overall job satisfaction, and 20-25 percent of nurses worked at 
their primary location for over 10 years. 
About 21 percent of those who have a Virginia nursing license did not 
work as a nurse in Virginia in 2014; although, only about 0.7 percent 
of licensees report being involuntarily unemployed. This shows that the 
overwhelming majority of nurses who desire to work as nurses are able to 
find employment in their field. Additionally, this indicates that more nurses 
are available to work than are actively employed as nurses. Probably not 
all of these individuals will return to nursing, but by retaining and renewing 
their nursing license, they show that they could be lured back, given the right 
circumstances (i.e., higher wages, better working conditions, etc.).
TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF REGISTERED NURSES IN 











5,124 803 1,155 681
Employed as 
RN
73,038 15,514 17,906 15,275
RN FTEs 72,089 14,396 15,320 13,942
FTEs/Employed 1.01 1.08 1.17 1.10
Unemployment 
Rate




3.48% 2.95% 4.67% 3.40%
Not Working 7.73% 7.07% 8.61% 5.26%
Works in 
Hospital (%)




3.7 3.0 2.5 3.0
Private (%) 83.8 83.0 88.4 82.3
State 
Government (%)
11.2 7.8 7.3 12.8
Federal 
Government (%)
5.0 9.3 4.4 5.0
Source: VA DHP, VA Healthcare Workforce Data Center, *as of February 2014
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Nursing Shortages 
And Their Cost
Few people may recall that until the mid-1960s, the country faced persistent 
nursing shortages. A Department of Labor report from 1947 described low 
pay, poor working conditions, long hours and lack of job satisfaction as the 
norm for nursing. Efforts to increase the number of nursing graduates did 
lead to more new nurse entrants, but the unattractive aspects associated 
with the profession kept the turnover rate high. However, in the mid-1960s, 
nursing changed as the health care industry began to blossom. The post-
war economic gains gave many Americans the wealth needed to pursue 
more health care and the Medicare/Medicaid expansions helped many 
poorer Americans also seek out health care. Taken together, the increased 
demand for health services led to rising industry wages. Suddenly, nursing 
became a profession that paid a living wage and could elevate workers to a 
higher economic status. The better prospects, combined with the baby boom 
generation entering the workforce and the increased women’s labor force 
participation, all led to the end of the nursing shortage by the mid 1970s.
Now these nurses are nearing retirement age, and there is no wave of 
nurses coming to replace them. In the early 2000s, nursing shortage reports 
began reappearing in the mass media. In 2002, the Bureau of Health 
Professions (BHP) issued national projections out to the year 2020 for full-
time-equivalency units of nurses. For 2015, the BHP projected that demand 
would be 2.56 million FTE nurses, while supply would be 2.06 million FTE 
nurses, a projected nationwide shortage of 500,000 full-time nurses. In 
reality, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports 2.7 million nurses are currently 
employed, several hundred thousand more than the BHP projections. 
The current BHP projections, released in December 2014, now 
predict that the nation will have a national surplus of 340,000 
FTE nurses by 2025. BHP divides its estimates by state, and 
predicts that Virginia will demand 87,300 FTE nurses, with a 
surplus of 19,400 FTE nurses, in 2025. 
The BHP reports this reversal happened, in part, because of the near 
doubling of nursing graduates since its earlier report. The severity of the 
2007-09 recession may also have kept the nation from a nursing shortage. 
The recession may have pushed potential retirees to delay retirement and 
convinced job seekers to aim for a health care career, since health care is 
always in demand. Also, since nurses are overwhelmingly female, increased 
male unemployment may have pushed more women to seek employment in 
a relatively well-paid (though hectic) career to sustain family budgets. Once 
the aftereffects of the recession are past, however, we may see a bigger 
than expected increase in retirements, causing a shortage to re-emerge. 
The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and 2010 Affordable 
Care Act both had provisions to help mitigate a nursing shortage by offering 
educational reimbursement for nurses who work at designated short-staffed 
hospitals and increased funding to previous federal education programs. 
These two acts likely spurred some additional participation in the nursing 
workforce in recent years, but will not have much long-term impact on 
nursing supply.
If the country has faced shortages before and recovered, why 
are people so worried now? The answer is that this seemingly 
small employment-sector issue could become a major public 
health problem if left untreated. A national nursing shortage could be 
analogous to all hospitals being understaffed simultaneously. A plethora of 
studies have shown that the number of nurses working on a shift has a direct 
impact on reducing adverse patient outcomes. The same is true with nurses’ 
skill level, measured in experience or education. Adverse patient outcomes 
include medication errors, infections, ulcers and patient falls, which can lead 
to an increase in the length of stay in hospitals, return visits to hospitals and 
doctors’ offices, and patient mortality rates. If a single short-staffed shift is 
problematic, then countrywide shortages could cause an epidemic.
Human suffering is self-evident and reason enough to fear a shortage, 
but the monetary costs from mistakes are also staggering. The Center on 
Medicare and Medicaid Services calculated the cost of “hospital acquired 
conditions” and found that these add up to $22 billion annually, roughly 
5.8 percent of the programs’ hospital expenditures. The average adverse-
event cost is almost the same as the median income for a nurse, $60,960. 
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Assuming that 5.8 percent is true for all patients (i.e., not just Medicare/
Medicaid patients), then the total expenditure for hospital-acquired 
conditions is $44 billion nationally and $1.05 billion in Virginia. 
In addition to the problems we can already see, a systemic nursing shortage 
would cause longer wait times to receive service, as health care facilities 
simply become unable to accommodate all incoming patients. This could 
cause prospective patients to look elsewhere for health care services, or 
reduced capacity elsewhere could cause patients from other locales to come 
to Hampton Roads and strain our health care resources. The United States 
typically has traded faster service for higher prices in the health sector, but 
with a shortage we may be left with only the higher prices.
None of this means we should start hiring as many nurses as possible 
right now or that more nurses are always better. Rather, this indicates that 
the stakes are high if Hampton Roads does face a nursing shortage in the 
coming decade. Currently, health care facilities can solve staffing problems 
with shift adjustments and a few extra hires. However, a shortage of a 
few hundred or few thousand nurses across the region would exacerbate 
these problems and be daunting to solve quickly due to education lags 
and increased competition for nurses in rival facilities. This issue is worth 
discussing because the consequences of not being prepared could be dire. 
Nursing Supply
Predicting the supply of a profession is notoriously difficult (note the big 
swing in the national projections from earlier), so we are going to look 
at the three main determinants of the quantity of nurses supplied: wages, 
program graduation rates, and retirements and migration.
The average real wage for registered nurses in Hampton Roads rose from 
$64,000 in 2007 to $67,000 in 2010, then declined to $60,800 in 2013. 
For the lowest 10 percent of the wage distribution, real income has steadily 
declined since 2008 and is at $43,200 currently. Nurses have lost a real 
dollar from their hourly wages since 2007, from $30.50 to $29.39 per 
hour. These results are largely consistent with Hampton Roads wage data for 
dental hygienists, office support staff, education and library employees, and 
sales professionals. Despite the near-zero nursing unemployment rate, the 
downward-wage pressure points to labor market slack. If the average wages 
are falling because high-wage individuals are working less or retiring, then 
we might expect low wages (the bottom 10 percent) to increase to attract 
more new workers. The opposite is happening. As long as nursing wages 
are not rising, there is less incentive for more nurses to keep working or for 
potential nurses to enter our market. 
Let’s now look at new nurse production. Using National Council Licensure 
Examination data over the last five years, on average the Commonwealth 
each year has 3,300 successful examinees (average pass rate of 86 
percent) and Hampton Roads has about 711 who pass the test (average 
pass rate of 82 percent). The DHP, in its total license report, notes that 
29,800 licenses were issued over the last five years; however, among 
renewing licensees in the DHP survey, we only see 20,900 survey 
respondents reporting that they were licensed in that period. This 
discrepancy could be from workers dropping out of the nursing workforce, 
moving and renewing with a different state, or just not responding correctly. 
Using the group that continues to be licensed, 14,200 responded that they 
received their nursing education in Virginia. 
This means that although 71.6 percent of nurses were trained in the 
Commonwealth, about 85 percent of the nurses trained in Virginia likely 
decided to stay locally. For Hampton Roads, about 70.4 percent were 
trained in Virginia. Given that over the last five years 2,700 local nurses 
were trained in Virginia and that Hampton Roads graduated 3,600 nurses, 
potentially 77 percent of our nurses have remained in the area. We need 
more demographic information to be certain of these numbers, but this is a 
good indicator that our region supplies most of its nursing needs. 
Of all the supply considerations, retirement expectations worry industry 
watchers the most. In Graph 1, the expected retirements by five-year period 
are presented for full study. Cumulatively, about 12 percent of the current 
nursing workforce expects to retire in five years, 26 percent in 10 years and 
50 percent in 20 years. The five-year spans with the most retirements are the 
2020-25 and 2025-30 periods for all areas. 
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This may seem very sudden and a little scary, so let’s digest the information. 
First, we do not have much historical data to see if retirements are 
accelerating or not. In 2013, statewide only 10 percent of the nursing 
workforce indicated plans to retire in five years. However, in 2010, more 
than 20 percent indicated plans to leave the profession in five years when 
responding to a differently phrased version of the question. Perhaps this 
amount of turnover is more common than we think. Nurses typically begin 
decreasing work hours after turning 55, and after 60 they work the fewest 
hours of all other workers, based on DHP calculations. We cannot be certain 
that all workers will wait to retire until 55, but over 90 percent of nurses 
have indicated they expect this to be true. Virginia and Hampton 
Roads face a 15-year critical period of elevated turnover 
from about now until 2030. Virginia will need to replace 
about 27,750 nurses and Hampton Roads about 6,130, 
approximately 39 percent of current nurses for each group.  
However, in the most recent five-year period, Virginia graduated 16,580 
nurses, including 3,557 from Hampton Roads. As long as we do not lose 
any nursing schools (and none of them shrink), we can roughly expect to 
produce about 49,700 nurses in Virginia and about 10,700 locally over 
the next 15 years. Obviously, not all nurses will stay local or even in the 
profession, so using a conservative estimate of Virginia nurses who stay 
local and working, say 65 percent, we can expect that about 32,300 nurses 
will remain in Virginia, including 6,900 in our region. Thus, our nurse 
supply estimates for Hampton Roads, based on retirements 
and local graduates, are 15,981 in 2020, 16,322 in 2030 and 
17,619 in 2040. The big increase in the last decade comes from 
slowing retirements. 
Luckily, our area attracts nurses from other states and even other countries; 
more than 1,000 in the past five years have moved to our region. If we add 
a constant amount of “imported” nurses, say 1,000 every five years, to our 
local-only supply, then we have the following for an open-supply estimate: 
16,981 in 2020, 19,322 in 2030 and 22,619 in 2040. The local and 
open-supply values are presented in Table 5 and Graph 2.
The takeaway: We should be able to manage the retirements if our nursing 
schools are filled and we make it worthwhile for our nurses to stay local. We 
have the structure in place to maintain the status quo. Though, just to make 
this clear, we are not saying we should only employ local nurses; rather, 
we are pointing out that our region produces enough nurses to handle the 
critical period of retirements. Once we acknowledge a mobile labor pool 
exists from other states and countries, we can see that we are even better 
positioned to replace retiring nurses. However, the status quo will go out the 
window with the heightened demand that is coming, which is the topic we 
take up next. To meet the new demand, we will need some combination of 
nurse imports and an expansion of our nursing programs. 
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GRAPH 1
EXPECTED NURSE RETIREMENTS, 2014
Graph 1 
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GRAPH 2
PROJECTED SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR HAMPTON ROADS NURSES
Source: Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, based upon American Association of Colleges of Nursing data
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Nursing Demand
Now let’s estimate the number of nurses our area will demand as various 
factors change over the next 20-25 years. But first, we need to think about 
what influences nursing demand and how we can measure this. Our basic 
framework is that nursing demand rises with the population 
count and the populace’s average age, but decreases as health 
care costs rise. 
We believe our framework is fairly self-evident, but to satisfy some burden 
of proof, we present some supporting information. We use standard age 
groups for our analysis: the young (those under 18 years), adults (those 18 
to 64) and the elderly (those 65 and older). 
When we make our predictions about the future, we will use the population 
projections by the Weldon Cooper Center’s Demographics and Workforce 
Group. By 2030, they project that the Commonwealth population will 
increase by 20 percent and Hampton Roads by 12 percent. For Virginia, 
the young population will grow by 15 percent, the adults by 
10.8 percent and the elderly population by a staggering 80.9 
percent. For Hampton Roads, the young population will grow 
by 3.6 percent, the adults by only 0.9 percent and the elderly 
by an even greater 89.5 percent. The age group proportions for our 
area will go from 26.8 percent to 24.8 percent for the young, 61.7 percent 
to 55.6 percent for adults, and 11.5 percent to 19.6 percent for the elderly. 
We believe the shifting age demographics will cause the “average level 
of health” to decrease, so we expect an increase in demand for nurses. 
This is probably not a surprise, but seeing the numbers will help tune our 
understanding. For our area, the portion of nurses who primarily treat adults 
is 38 percent, followed by 15 percent for the elderly and 13 percent for 
the young, with the rest reporting equal time among groups. Using a quick 
“nurse time”-to-population ratio, adults use 0.62 and the young use 0.49 
“units of nurse time,” while the elderly use 1.30 units. Once the elderly 
population reaches 19 percent of the populace, around 25 percent of nurses 
might need to be devoted to elder care.
Another factor that may increase demand can be found in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, widely expected to continue 
to increase insurance coverage and lower health care costs. We have no 
desire to debate the finer legal points or to issue definitive statements on its 
outcomes. For better or worse, we simply believe it will affect the area. From 
October 2013 to February 2015, more than 384,000 Virginia residents 
signed up for coverage under the federal marketplace, as Virginia chose not 
to establish its own state exchange. Hampton Roads and Richmond each 
had 64,000 signups (16.6 percent of the state total) and Northern Virginia 
(including Jefferson County, W.Va., due to reporting methods) had 151,000 
(39 percent). With some back-of-the-envelope calculations, the Virginia and 
Hampton Roads uninsured rate could have fallen from 12 percent in 2013 
to 8 percent now for each area. For Richmond, the rate could be about 
7 percent and for Northern Virginia between 6.5 percent and 7 percent. 
This represents about a one-third decrease in the uninsured. In 2012, the 
Kaiser Family Foundation issued a report authored by members of the Urban 
Institute that projected Virginia uninsured numbers falling by 50 percent if 
all states adopted Medicaid expansion and 30 percent if no states adopted. 
Given the mix of state decisions, our quick numbers corroborate their 
projections. 
Insurance is important for health care demand because it dramatically 
decreases the cost to consumers. As more people obtain health coverage, 
more of the population is willing and able to consume more health care 
services. Thus, the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) increase in coverage should 
lead to more demand for nurses. However, the aspiration of the law is to 
help people seek preventive care rather than more expensive reactive care. 
If the ACA succeeds in increasing coverage, then nursing demand might 
decrease because people will be in better health. Nevertheless, in the short 
run, we expect increased coverage to increase health care demand.
A way to quickly check our framework is to compare ourselves to areas 
right now. We have calculated MSA group averages based on the variables 
discussed above, to see how Hampton Roads compares, using BLS and ACS 
data from 2012. Table 3 has many different avenues we could discuss, but 
rather than traveling each one, we will simply point out some helpful facts. 
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TABLE 3
COMPARING HAMPTON ROADS TO OTHER METROPOLITAN AREAS
















Hampton Roads 1,706,816 12,840 $61,333 12.6 7.9 11.5 13.1 0.88 0.75% 5.97%
All MSA Avg 395 491,879 6,498 $65,193 14.2 8.8 14.1 16.8 1.14 1.32% 9.29%
Pop > 1Million 27 2,459,299 21,427 $69,840 12.7 8.2 13.4 14.3 1.02 0.87% 6.87%
High Avg RN Income 70 970,140 13,927 $83,695 13.9 10.6 14.1 15.3 1.07 1.44% 10.32%
Low Avg RN Income 70 236,743 2,174 $54,230 14.3 8.1 14.1 17.2 1.12 0.92% 6.44%
Near HR Avg RN 
Income
118 434,934 4,206 $60,431 14.8 8.6 13.8 16.5 1.16 0.97% 6.54%
High Elderly Portion 57 316,706 2,999 $62,232 19.3 10.7 14.2 16.5 1.24 0.95% 4.92%
Low Elderly Portion 65 780,565 6,410 $67,855 10.4 8.0 16.0 18.2 1.01 0.82% 7.87%
Near HR Elderly 
Portion
23 576,490 5,608 $67,600 12.5 7.3 12.7 15.1 1.03 0.97% 7.77%
High Male 
Unemployment Rate
58 331,246 2,458 $67,585 15.9 13.6 16.8 19.5 1.16 0.74% 4.66%
Low Male 
Unemployment Rate
58 353,440 3,345 $60,435 12.5 4.8 13.1 15.3 1.14 0.95% 7.55%
Near HR Male 
Unemployment Rate
32 612,723 5,972 $65,978 13.1 7.9 12.8 15.9 1.17 0.97% 7.45%
High Insurance 
Coverage
79 491,725 5,954 $64,313 14.4 7.2 7.8 13.4 1.17 1.21% 8.38%
Low Insurance 
Coverage
79 514,961 4,350 $64,752 13.8 9.9 21.2 20.3 1.06 0.84% 6.13%
Near HR Insurance 
Coverage
17 885,015 6,935 $63,648 14.0 8.0 11.5 15.0 1.07 0.78% 5.58%
High LO.Q. 71 255,520 3,813 $62,419 15.5 9.0 14.2 17.6 1.63 1.49% 9.64%
Low LO.Q. 72 475,937 4,534 $66,214 12.2 8.2 15.1 17.2 0.76 0.95% 7.79%
Near HR LO.Q. 33 516,058 6,089 $68,106 12.7 8.5 13.8 16.9 0.88 1.18% 9.28%
Source: BLS, ACS 2012 -2013  
BLS nurse amount differs from DHP, as discussed earlier. 
LO.Q. is Location Quotient, compares area nurse employment to national average. 
“High” = Top 20%; “Low” = Bottom 20%; “Near HR” = +/ – 3 units from Hampton Roads current.
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Hampton Roads employs a higher-than-average amount of nurses yet pays 
below average – $8,000 less than other large MSAs. Comparing high-
paying areas to low-paying ones, the higher-paying areas employ more 
nurses per capita and per elderly person, but the lowest-paying areas do 
not differ that much from the more-average-paying areas. Perhaps nurse 
pay is not a major determining factor in nurse location outside of the top 
areas. However, while we pay less, our poverty, uninsured and male 
unemployment rates are lower than many other areas. Interestingly, areas 
with large populations of elderly residents have a lower nurse per elderly 
person rate than other areas, when we would expect the opposite. If elderly 
people need more health care, why do areas with high concentrations of 
elderly residents have relatively fewer nurses? Perhaps the elderly require 
more health assistants and specialist physicians, but not more nurses. 
Alternatively, these areas could provide health care more efficiently because 
they have adapted to their elderly clients. While we are confident that the 
aging of the population will have an effect, we should not assume the effects 
will be catastrophic or that we cannot adapt to a larger elderly population. 
A location quotient (LO.Q.) below 1 indicates an area has a smaller nursing 
sector than would be expected, based on national averages. MSAs have 
on average 14 percent more nurses than expected, but we have 12 percent 
fewer. One possible explanation is that our area has a more diversified 
economy (i.e., all levels of government and shipbuilding, plus the usual 
sectors), which could disrupt this value since we have more sectors in our 
economy.
So will Hampton Roads need more nurses?
Yes.
How many? 
That is harder to answer.
We know that population increases, demographic changes, insurance 
expansion and cost changes will move in such a way that we will need more 
nurses. Using metropolitan area data from 2007 to 2012, plus the projected 
demographics changes, we have quantified some of the relationships 
discussed above for Hampton Roads’ future nursing needs to answer how 
many. 
In Table 4, we calculate how the three primary variables will affect our 
nursing requirements. Population has a 5:2 relationship with 
nurses, so for every 5 percent increase in population we 
will need 2 percent more nurses. By 2040, we expect the 
population to increase by 17 percent, so roughly we will 
need slightly more than 1,000 more nurses due only to 
population growth. The elderly portion of the population has 
a 5:1 relationship. Given that this group will almost double, 
we expect to need about 2,000 more nurses by 2040. The 
uninsured relationship is actually the largest at 5:3, but since 
there isn’t much room for the uninsured rate to decrease, this 
might not cause too much change in nursing demand. If the 
uninsured rate decreases by 10 points, then we believe this 
could raise our nursing requirements by another thousand. We 
found other relationships that increase or decrease our nursing needs, but 
the above were the most prevailing relationships.
We predict that Hampton Roads, based on current estimates, 
will demand 10 percent more nurses by 2020, 18 percent 
more by 2030 and 22 percent more by 2040. Based on DHP 
reported nurses, this will take our area from 15,514 to about 
17,000 nurses in 2020, about 18,371 in 2030 and about 
18,880 in 2040.
Supply and demand estimates are shown in Table 5 and in Graph 2. Using 
our estimate of 65 percent staying local (about 460), our area will face 
a “local” shortage for the next 15 years. We would need more than 85 
percent to stay in the area to not face a shortage. Again, Hampton Roads 
cannot meet its demand using only local nurse production. But, once we 
allow nurses from other areas to fill positions, we can easily meet demand. 
If we hire 200 out-of-area nurses every year (1,000 every five years), then 
we are near equilibrium until 2030, when we begin to have large surpluses 
due to decreasing retirements. This is why we say Hampton Roads is well 
positioned for the future. As long as our nursing programs remain 
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healthy and our area remains attractive to job seekers, we 
should not face any major hardships due to the increased 
demand for nurses. 
Remember, these values depend on the projections we have been discussing 
and the assumption that certain economic characteristics of our area 
remain stable over the next 20-25 years. If the elderly population somehow 
decreases or a shift in military presence occurs, then these projections would 
change dramatically. Finally, the model assumes that we will employ nurses 
exactly the same way for the next 20 years, which we believe is unlikely 
and unwise.
TABLE 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHICS AND 
REGISTERED NURSES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Current Amounts
RNs 15,514  --
Population 1,716,624 --
Elderly Population 216,295 12.6%
Uninsured Population 214,578 12.5%
Population Change RNs Needed
1% Increase 17,166 63
15% Increase 257,494 949
Elderly Portion
Increase to 15% 2.4% 616
Increase to 20% 7.4% 1,913
Uninsured
Decrease to 7% -94,414 542
Decrease to 2% -180,246 1,034
Source: ACS 2014 and 2013, DHP 2015, SOTR Estimates 2015
TABLE 5











2015 15,514 15,514 15,514 0 0
2020 15,981 16,981 17,000 -1,019 -19
2025 16,102 18,102 17,685 -1,584 416
2030 16,322 19,322 18,371 -2,048 952
2035 16,988 20,988 18,625 -1,637 2,363
2040 17,619 22,619 18,880 -1,260 3,740
Local Supply: expected retirements + predicted new local nurses 
Open Supply: local supply + 200 imported nurses per year 
Demand is estimated using MSA trends from 2007 to 2012
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Concluding Remarks And 
Policy Implications
We now present options for confronting the coming increase in nursing 
demand. These options are viable and practical, whether one believes that 
we have grossly underestimated or overestimated the future supply and 
demand. If we are underestimating our need, then use multiple options and 
go big. If we are overestimating, these options are still useful because they 
do not harm our area or the nursing market. Note that none of this is new 
thinking, and versions of these options are already being pursued. We are 
simply presenting the ideas worth considering going forward.
The first option is the easiest: Make nursing more desirable. Either increase 
the benefits of a nursing career or reduce the cost. The economic way to 
deal with a worker shortage is to increase the wage, as increasing wages 
communicates to the market a need for more nurses. However, as we found, 
high wages are not the strong signal we would expect. Higher wages may 
be more likely to convince local students to stay and outside nurses to enter 
only if they are already considering the area. 
An alternative to higher wages is to decrease the cost of becoming a nurse 
through educational subsidies. From a nurse’s point of view, or that of a 
business, this may be almost as good if not better. Businesses may like 
this because they are agreeing to a specific time of service rather than 
committing to a career’s length of higher pay. Similarly, nurses could reduce 
their debt burden, allowing them more financial freedom. In Hampton 
Roads, 68 percent of all nurses under age 40 are paying off educational 
debt. Providing debt relief for continued service may keep current nurses 
working longer and future cost relief may lure more nurses to our area. This 
is probably the tactic that has been most widely used in the past, because 
it seems to work. The strategy, while effective, has an obvious delay in that 
prospective nurses must still go through a two- or four-year process to realize 
the payoff. If this strategy is to be used, then it must start soon and be 
maintained for a decade or longer.
However, employers can make the job better in other ways, such as 
improving worker safety; offering flexible hours (especially for parents), 
stress reduction programs and social and recreation activities; and 
encouraging increased communication with management. Services that let 
nurses know they are valued, such as providing balanced meals for those 
who work over a certain number of hours per week, could vastly improve 
worker morale. Creating a “happy” work environment is important no matter 
the job. These approaches will not solve a nursing shortage, but can help an 
individual facility maintain nurses (and certainly make nurses happier).
Second, invest in local nursing programs so that we will be able to produce 
more nurses. This investment could provide grants for more teaching space 
and/or more instructors to expand class capacity. Nursing programs 
consistently turn down many qualified applicants because of lack of 
space in their programs. A major one-time investment for expansion could 
permanently increase our output potential. Once larger, the programs should 
become self-sustaining via increased tuition. Such a grant would likely 
need to come from either wealthy donors or governments, as education 
administrators are unlikely to invest for fear of overcapacity and lack of will 
to spend heavily on nursing programs. Expansion grants should be available 
both to those taking traditional nursing routes and to individuals with LPN 
licenses and nurse assistants taking advancement programs. Most nurses 
will come from traditional degree programs, but by promoting LPN to RN 
advancement programs, we strengthen the social ladder and increase the 
diversity of experience for nurses.
We do not think that the solution is a continuous subsidy to nursing schools. 
Investing to expand programs is not the same as giving them an allowance. 
The goal is to allow programs to admit more qualified applicants, not 
provide a stream of funding so programs do not need to compete for 
applicants.
Third, keeping the education-to-employment pipeline clear should be a 
priority. Employers should be explicit in communicating their expected 
need for nurses, especially to nursing schools. Retirements can easily be 
anticipated and immediate demand can be calculated by employers, 
so there is no reason not to be open with education programs or the 
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Commonwealth’s employment commission. About a third of nurses say they 
plan on increasing their education over the next two years, presumably 
for some level of career advancement. Employers should track career 
goals to identify those planning on retiring and hoping to advance. In an 
ideal world, employers would communicate directly with their staff about 
expectations, then announce their anticipated job openings to nursing 
programs. Already, nursing programs have practical components where 
students work at health care facilities, so a dialogue is clearly possible. 
Still, such communication is difficult and many people are uncomfortable 
being upfront with career goals. Clearer communication between the main 
suppliers and employers of nurses can only be a good thing.
Fourth, our predictions show that Hampton Roads must import nurses to 
help meet its demand, so local employers need to reach out to job seekers in 
other areas. This can be as simple as fostering contacts in out-of-area nursing 
schools. Employers will need to be proactive about hiring nurses, especially 
if other areas also expect shortages similar to ours. This suggestion to 
advertise open jobs is the least groundbreaking, but based on our estimates 
it could be the most important. 
Finally, if we believe we will face a sea change in health care because of 
population dynamics, then we should rethink how service is provided. The 
biggest obstacle to overcoming problems is assuming the current way is 
the only way forward. Promote workplace innovation; reward suggestions 
that work. Many ideas will be bad, but do not let that stop the search for 
the good (or at least the better than it was). Of course, having said that, 
economists do not have the answer to what employers should do (for once!). 
Some suggest giving nurses more control over staffing decisions, increasing 
LPN responsibilities to distribute the workload or shifting more work to 
machines rather than humans. If the problem is that we might not have 
enough nurses, then the best solution may be the one that does not require 
more nurses to implement.
Over the next 15 to 20 years, Hampton Roads will undergo major 
demographic changes that will touch upon different aspects of our 
community. In health care, these changes will affect both supply and 
demand. Demand is expected to increase as the population both grows 
and ages, as insurance coverage increases to near universal levels 
and, inevitably, as health technology makes health care more available. 
However, the large baby boom cohort of nurses is set to retire in the next 
15 years with no large group to follow them, and there is little immediate 
indication that nursing schools will expand in time to replace these nurses 
and fill demand. 
Luckily, our area is in a good position to face the coming market changes. 
We produce enough local nurses that the retirements should not be a 
problem if graduation rates stay constant. However, we will either need to 
entice nurses from other areas or expand our nursing school capacity by a 
few hundred to meet the new demand. We benefit from several advantages, 
including a healthy economy, a favorable geographic location and a 
constant influx of individuals who call Hampton Roads home. 

The Economics Of Casino 
Gambling In Hampton Roads
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THE ECONOMICS OF CASINO GAMBLING IN HAMPTON ROADS
S
ince the 1990s, legalized gambling has spread across the United States, with a majority of state governments sponsoring lotteries and hosting 
commercial or tribal casinos. Despite concerns of “market saturation,” the casino industry continues to expand, particularly in the Northeast. In 2014, 
commercial casinos earned revenues of around $39 billion, while tribal casinos netted another $29 billion (David Schwartz, Center for Gaming 
Research, University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
Virginia is among those states that have not taken the casino plunge. 
However, with casinos well established nearby in West Virginia, Maryland, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, many Virginians have easy access 
to legalized gambling venues. However, Virginia also sits at the northern 
edge of a region in which casinos are rare. Very limited opportunities for 
legal casino gambling exist in Kentucky, Tennessee and North Carolina. 
Consequently, concerns over “market saturation,” perhaps illustrated by the 
closure of four casinos in Atlantic City in 2014, are not necessarily relevant 
to the issue of potential casinos in Virginia. 
In recent years, there have been discussions of bringing casino gambling to 
Virginia; the most common proposal has been to build a casino in Hampton 
Roads. Despite the recent failure of a proposal in the state Senate to create 
a gaming commission, there is likely to be continuing discussion focusing on 
the introduction of casinos in Virginia.
Background
The introduction of casinos nearly always is a controversial 
topic. Despite apparent economic benefits, such as tax 
revenues and employment, there are also potential costs, 
including problem gambling, increased crime and negative 
impacts on competing industries. Many of these issues were 
addressed in a 2013 report jointly authored by the Hampton Roads 
Transportation Planning Organization and the Hampton Roads Planning 
District Commission. 
The HRTPO/HRPDC report relied upon a variety of sometimes questionable 
assumptions concerning how many customers would be attracted to a 
new Hampton Roads casino and debatable assumptions concerning likely 
spending per patron, estimated casino revenues and casino taxes. The 
report also provided estimates of the number of jobs that a casino would 
create, plus the contribution of a new casino to gross regional product 
and regional personal income. The report further estimated that there were 
approximately 500,000 potential customers for a Hampton Roads casino 
and they would spend an estimated $210 million to $600 million per year 
in and around the casino. Using a mid-range estimate of $375 million in 
casino revenue and a moderate casino revenue tax rate of 30 percent, the 
study estimated casino tax revenues of about $113 million per year. 
The HRTPO/HRPDC study additionally estimated that a casino operation 
in Hampton Roads that employed 2,000 people could increase overall 
regional employment by 2,000 to 2,500 jobs, and supplement regional 
gross product by between $78 million and $107 million per year. Such 
estimates are based on previous studies of casinos in similar regions, but 
there is little evidence of how reliable the estimates are. 
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The Regional Casino Market
Casino gambling is available in many states to the west and north of 
Virginia. Racetrack casinos exist in West Virginia, and five casinos have 
opened in Maryland since 2010. In 2016, a new casino, MGM National 
Harbor, will open in Prince George’s County, Md., which will be very 
convenient to residents of Northern Virginia. Figure 1 locates the casinos 
that currently operate in the mid-Atlantic region. The Hampton Roads 
area, represented by the star, is relatively isolated from casino gambling 
opportunities. The closest casino is the Ocean Downs racetrack casino at 
Berlin, Md. (about 130 miles from Virginia Beach).  
A casino located in Hampton Roads would serve residents of the immediate 
area and possibly Richmond. Richmond is about 105 miles from National 
Harbor and 60 miles from Newport News. It is difficult to predict which 
casino might be more attractive to Richmond residents. On one hand, 
the MGM National Harbor casino would be bigger than a casino in the 
Hampton Roads region, but perhaps traffic would be less of an issue for a 
casino in our region. 
Table 1 lists the casinos and racetrack/casinos from Figure 1 that are within 
250 miles (roughly a maximum four-hour drive) of Portsmouth. The table also 
lists the number of machine and table games available at each location. 
Given the location of Hampton Roads relative to Richmond, it further shows 
the distance of each casino to Richmond. A casino in Portsmouth would be 
about 90 miles from Richmond, or about a 90- to120-minute drive. 
While there are casino gaming opportunities north of Virginia, the 
opportunities to the south and southwest are limited. Because of this, 
opportunity does exist for a casino in southeast Virginia to attract patrons 
from North Carolina and South Carolina. 




Source: D.M. Walker, College of Charleston
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TABLE 1 

























Colonial Downs New Kent, VA
Harness, 
Thoroughbred
n/a n/a 74.3 1 h 17 m 26.4 27 m
Ocean Downs Berlin, MD Harness 800 n/a 138 2 h 27 m 221 3 h 37 m
Harrington 
Raceway
Harrington, DE Harness 1,800 51 176 3 h 9 m 198 3 h 5 m
MGM National 
Harbor






Harness n/a n/a 200 3 h 3 min 109 1 h 39 m
Dover Downs Dover, DE Harness 2,600 58 200 3 h 33 m 205 3 h 16 m
Maryland Live Hanover, MD n/a 4,332 177 227 3 h 30 m 137 2 h 10 m




Thoroughbred 2,700 124 237 3 h 49 m 147 2 h 30 m
Delaware Park Wilmington, DE Thoroughbred 2,540 88 241 4 h 5 m 211 3 h 17 m
Sources: www.casinocity.com; MGM National Harbor expected data from www.worldcasinodirectory.com 
Note: The Greenbrier is within 250 miles and has a casino. However, one must be a guest to play there. 
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Economic Impact Of Casinos
The most commonly discussed economic impacts of casinos include 
earmarked tax revenues, impacts on employment and wages, and effects on 
other firms and industries. 
TAX REVENUES
One of the most important reasons that policymakers are attracted by 
casinos is potential tax revenue. Let’s review the literature to see what we 
might anticipate in Hampton Roads.   
While the available evidence suggests that, on average, 
the introduction of a casino will lead to increases in overall 
tax revenues, the relationship is not as strong as one might 
imagine. Many regions have experienced only modest net increases in 
overall tax revenues because spending in casinos often displaces spending 
that would have occurred for other goods and services. In other words, 
although overall tax revenues may increase because of the introduction of 
a casino, we should also expect certain other sectors of our economy to be 
negatively impacted by a casino. However, these negative effects would be 
smaller if a casino attracted a large percentage of its patrons from outside 
Hampton Roads. 
Why are politicians often adamant in their support for casinos as a tax 
revenue tool? One possible explanation is that casinos provide a large 
political benefit to policymakers. It may be easier to increase casino taxes 
than it is to raise income, sales or property taxes. 
The introduction of casinos in a state may also result in “import substitution.” 
This boils down to casinos keeping Virginia money in Virginia. Rather 
than spend money out of state, Virginians spend that money within the 
Commonwealth.
Whatever the actual economic impact of casino taxes, they are the major 
argument used by the industry and supporters in promoting the legalization 
and expansion of the casino industry. As casinos have spread across the 
country, some states (examples include Delaware and Indiana) actually 
have been considering lowering the tax rates on casino revenues due to 
increasing regional competition. Thus, it is unclear whether casinos in any 
particular state will continue to have the fiscal stimulus effect they may have 
had in the past. Some regions of the country are approaching saturation in 
terms of the number of casinos.
It is difficult to estimate how much revenue a Hampton Roads casino might 
earn each year. The amount depends on the local population, the volume 
of tourism, the size of the casino, and how much individuals spend at the 
casino, among other factors. However, we can provide a rough estimate by 
looking at a similar market – Kansas City, Missouri.    
The population of the Kansas City metropolitan area is about 2 million 
people. Total casino revenues in Kansas City were just above $700 million 
in 2010. Annual per capita casino spending was roughly $350. Clearly 
there are differences between Kansas City and Hampton Roads (for 
example, Kansas City has several casinos and they have been operating for 
several decades). Nonetheless, if we assume conservatively that a Hampton 
Roads casino would result in per capita spending of $250 per person, then 
with a regional population of about 1.7 million, the annual estimated casino 
revenues for a casino here would approximate $425 million. 
To the extent that residents from outside our region (for example, from North 
Carolina or Richmond) might be interested in gambling at a Hampton Roads 
casino, actual revenues would be higher. 
It is relatively simple to predict casino tax receipts. Table 2 provides tax 
revenue estimates for Hampton Roads under different assumptions. Most 
states apply tax rates ranging from 20 percent to 30 percent of casino 
revenues, although there is great variance – some as low as 6 percent and 
some as high as 70 percent.  
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A reasonable estimated range of casino taxes that might be raised from a 
Hampton Roads casino is $70 million to $150 million. This range assumes 
modest casino revenues and average casino tax rates.
Nonetheless, to the extent that casino expenditures reduce other 
expenditures, we must subtract lost sales tax revenue because of decreased 
spending on other goods and services. If a dollar spent at the casino 
represented one dollar less spent at the Patrick Henry Mall, or 
at the Virginia Beach oceanfront, then there would be no net 
new tax collections at all.  The key, then, would be to attract 
gamblers from outside of Hampton Roads.  
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
Casino proponents point to local employment as one of the key economic 
benefits of casinos. It is true, of course, that a large casino resort is labor 
intensive to build and to operate. Hence, it would be surprising if casinos 
did not have a positive impact on local employment. If casinos create 
enough jobs to stimulate demand in the local labor market, then they could 
also have a positive impact on wages.
As with casino taxes, one concern about the employment impacts of casinos 
is whether casino jobs come at the expense of other local businesses. 
Several studies have examined this “substitution effect” with empirical 
evidence. The majority of studies have found at least modestly positive 
employment and wage effects from casinos. One study on employment and 
payrolls in several Mississippi counties found that …
“the legalization and subsequent development of casino gaming did 
not drive all the local restaurants out of business. Casinos did not cause 
the predicted drop in the number of businesses, nor the drop in people 
employed, nor the drop in payroll. In fact, just the opposite occurs.”1 
However, a recent Canadian study warns:  
“The evidence presented in this paper suggests that a skeptical 
approach be taken regarding the use of employment and earnings 
gains to justify the legalization or expansion of casino gambling within 
a locality. Any expectations of new jobs or earnings enhancement 
should be considered short-term and narrowly-focused within the 
gambling and hospitality industries. Broad employment and earnings 
gains in other local industries outside of gambling and hospitality should 
not be expected.”2
University of Connecticut economist Chad Cotti has produced the most 
comprehensive and authoritative study published dealing with the 
employment and wage impacts of casinos in the United States.3 He found 
positive employment impacts of casinos, but very small or insignificant wage 
1  K. Hashimoto and G.G. Fenich (2003). “Does Casino Development Destroy Local Food and Beverage 
Operations?  Development of Casinos in Mississippi,” Gaming Law Review, 7, p. 101-109. Other studies 
that examine the employment and/or wage effects of casinos include: E.P. Morse and E.A. Goss (2007). 
Governing fortune: Casino gambling in America. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.; T.A. Garrett 
(2004). “Casino Gaming and Local Employment Trends,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 86(1), 
9-22.; B.R. Humphreys and J. Marchand (2013). “New casinos and local labor markets: Evidence from 
Canada.” Labour Economics, 24, 151-160.
2 B.R. Humphreys and J. Marchand (2013). “New Casinos and Local Labor Markets: Evidence from 
Canada,” Labour Economics, 24, 151-160.
3 C. Cotti (2008). “The Effect of Casinos on Local Labor Markets: A County Level Analysis.” Journal of 
Gambling Business and Economics, 2(2), 17-41.
TABLE 2 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL CASINO TAX RECEIPTS
Annual Casino 
Revenues
Tax Rate on Casino Revenues
20% 30% 40%
$350 million $70 million $105 million $140 million
$425 million $85 million $127.5 million $170 million
$500 million $100 million $150 million $200 million
Source: D.M. Walker, College of Charleston
The “Casino Jobs Machine” sometimes works in reverse. 
The declining popularity of gambling in Atlantic City, N.J., 
resulted in a loss of 8,000 casino and related hotel employees 
by summer 2015.
– USA Today (June 10, 2015)
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impacts. In a moment, we will use Cotti’s estimated employment and wage 
effects to predict the likely impact of casinos in Hampton Roads.
Cotti collected employment, wage and operating firm count data for 28 
quarters (1990-1996) on all counties in the United States, except those in 
Nevada and New Jersey. There were 161 counties that had casinos open 
within their borders during this sample period. No distinction was made 
between tribal casinos and commercial casinos. 
Cotti’s estimates focused on two types of county-level data. He analyzed 
“All Industries” in the counties, as well as a subset of industries, categorized 
as “Leisure and Hospitality.” The leisure and hospitality industries include 
two subsectors, “Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation” (NAICS 71) and 
“Accommodation and Food Service” (NAICS 72). The former classification 
includes:
“(1) establishments that are involved in producing, promoting, or 
participating in live performances, events, or exhibits intended for public 
viewing; (2) establishments that preserve and exhibit objects and sites 
of historical, cultural, or educational interest; and (3) establishments that 
operate facilities or provide services that enable patrons to participate 
in recreational activities or pursue amusement, hobby and leisure-time 
interests.”4
The Accommodation and Food Services sector includes “establishments 
providing customers with lodging and/or preparing meals, snacks, and 
beverages for immediate consumption.”5 One important factor in estimating 
the likely employment and wage effects of a new casino is the casino-
hosting county’s population. A casino resort would represent a large 
business in a county that has a small population, such as a rural county in 
Virginia. In such a case, the estimated county-level impact of casinos on 
employment and earnings would be relatively large. Alternatively, a casino 
resort would represent a relatively small component of the economy in a 
very populous county (or city), such as one in Virginia Beach, and would 
therefore be expected to have a small impact on employment and earnings, 
in percentage terms. Cotti’s results bear this out.
4 http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag71.htm (accessed March 25, 2015).
5 www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag72.htm (accessed March 25, 2015).
When controlling for county size, Cotti found much smaller impacts for large-
population counties. The potential casino locations considered in this report 
for Virginia were Virginia Beach, Portsmouth and Newport News/Hampton. 
All fall into the large-population county group. The estimated impacts Cotti 
found for large-population counties are shown in Table 3. These are the 
estimated employment and earnings effects that would apply to a casino 
opening in Hampton Roads.
Table 3 reveals that the likely overall impacts on employment and earnings 
from a Hampton Roads casino are relatively small. However, there would 
be a modest positive impact on the entertainment/hospitality sector of our 
economy. These results echo those of the Canadian study quoted earlier.
It is important to note that, according to Cotti’s results, there would not likely 
be any significant employment or wage effects on neighboring counties to 
the casino county. This means that the modest employment and wage effects 
shown above are assumed to be confined to the particular county hosting 
the casino. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the projected employment and earnings effects of 
opening a casino in Newport News/Hampton, Portsmouth or Virginia 
TABLE 3 






All Industries + 0.28% - 0.12%
Entertainment (NAICS 71) +17.6% + 7.89%
Hospitality (NAICS 72) + 0.65% + 1.1%
Weighted Average 
of Entertainment and 
Hospitality Sectors*
+ 3.61% + 2.28%
Source: Chad Cotti (2008, p. 34) 
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Beach. Computed by Douglas Walker of the College of Charleston, these 
estimates are based on Cotti’s weighted average estimates in Table 3 and 
are shown for the overall city of interest (labeled “All Industry”) and for the 
“Entertainment and Hospitality” sector in each city. Since the most recent city 
data available are for the second quarter of 2014, the projections assume a 
casino opened in the third quarter of 2014, and there is a one-time casino 
effect on employment and wages.
Tables 4 and 5 make it clear that there likely would be a very modest impact 
on employment – mainly confined to the entertainment and hospitality 
industries. Plus, there might be a very small earnings effect from a new 
casino.6 Most of the job expansion in the entertainment and hospitality 
sectors would likely come at the expense of other industries. Nevertheless, 
the new employment would be a benefit.
INTRA-INDUSTRY IMPACTS
Whenever a state or locality is considering the expansion of legalized 
gambling, it should consider the likely impact a casino will have on other 
gambling industries. This is because, from the consumer’s perspective, one 
6 The projections use each variable’s trend, based on average quarterly change from 2003-14. Future 
values were projected by taking the last same-quarter observation and adding the trend. So, if employment 
increased at a 0.5 percent rate, and the 2014Q2 employment was 10,000, then we predict the 2015Q2 
employment at 10,050, calculated as 10,000*1.005.
TABLE 4 
PROJECTED “ALL INDUSTRY” CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS WITH CASINO OPENING













150,972 151,395 423 $877.75 $876.69 -$1.06
Portsmouth 44,098 44,222 124 $932.47 $931.35 -$1.12
Virginia Beach 172,136 172,618 482 $744.60 $743.71 -$0.89
Source: D.M. Walker
TABLE 5
PROJECTED “LEISURE AND HOSPITALITY” CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS WITH CASINO OPENING













15,206 15,754 548 $288.09 $294.66 $6.57
Portsmouth 2,792 2,893 101 $285.31 $291.82 $6.51
Virginia Beach 30,508 31,609 1,101 $328.67 $336.17 $7.50
Source: D.M. Walker
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type of gambling may be a good substitute for another. That is, a person 
who routinely purchases lottery tickets now may decide to frequent a new 
casino rather than buy lottery tickets. Such an effect on a large scale could 
have a real impact on the state’s tax receipts. In Virginia, the only other 
significant form of legal gambling is the state lottery. 
A variety of studies have examined the relationships among different 
gambling industries, particularly between lotteries and casinos. Most 
of these studies indicate that there is, in fact, a “substitute” relationship 
between gambling industries. In particular, the introduction of casino 
gambling is likely to have a negative impact on lottery ticket sales. 
The most recent, and perhaps more “micro-level,” analysis of the impact of 
casinos on the lottery was done in Maryland.7 The analysis used ZIP code-
level monthly lottery sales data in Maryland to determine the impact that 
casinos have had on lottery sales. It concluded that casinos in Maryland 
had a negative impact of about 2.75 percent on annual lottery sales. Two 
additional casinos that will be opening in Maryland are forecast to cause 
another 2.6 percent decline in lottery sales. Altogether, the six Maryland 
casinos are predicted to cause a reduction in lottery sales of around 
5 percent.
If a casino were to open in Hampton Roads, there likely would be some 
negative impact on local lottery sales, perhaps a decline in the range of 
2 percent to 5 percent. However, the total impact likely would not be as 
large as that in Maryland. This is because Maryland has casinos located 
throughout the state; therefore, most of the state’s population has easy 
access to gambling venues. A single casino in Hampton Roads would only 
impact local lottery sales, which would not be huge with respect to the 
state’s total lottery sales. It is worth noting, however, that the casino coming 
to National Harbor, a short distance from Northern Virginia, likely will 
dampen Virginia sales near it. Some believe this is a reason in favor of 
Virginia opening casinos. 
The lottery in Virginia has been relatively successful in a national context. 
Graph 1 reports lottery sales for fiscal years 1993 to 2013, uncorrected 
7  See D.M. Walker and W.E. Cummings (2015). “The Effect of Casino Proximity on Lottery Sales: Zip Code-
Level Evidence from Maryland.” College of Charleston working paper.
for price inflation. Since the Great Recession, the Virginia lottery has seen a 
strong increase in sales – from about $1.37 billion in 2009 to $1.69 billion 
in 2013. 
THE ECONOMICS OF CASINO GAMBLING IN HAMPTON ROADS 135
GRAPH 1 
NOMINAL LOTTERY SALES, FISCAL YEARS 1993-2013*
Source: D.M. Walker and W.E. Cummings (2015), “The Effect of Casino Proximity on Lottery Sales: Zip Code-Level Evidence from Maryland,” 
College of Charleston working paper 
* Data include traditional lottery sales only.
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Social Costs Of Gambling
Casinos can be beneficial to a local economy because they provide an 
additional entertainment option for consumers, may attract tourists and 
may stimulate local employment and tax receipts, as discussed above. Yet, 
casinos are not a panacea for economic woes. As noted earlier, some of the 
benefits of casinos may be offset by losses in other industries. In addition, 
one of the key arguments against casinos is that they may be responsible for 
significant social costs.
The social costs of gambling have received a lot of attention in the literature, 
especially during the 1990s when casinos were first beginning their spread 
across the United States. Most of these costs, which we shall describe 
in more detail, are attributable to individuals who develop a gambling 
problem, akin to alcohol or drug abuse. That is, problem gamblers are 
individuals who gamble to an extent that it disrupts their personal or 
professional life, or causes them financial stress or ruin.
Problem gamblers often engage in antisocial behavior. Studies that have 
attempted to measure the social costs of gambling have included negative 
impacts, including crime, political corruption, bankruptcy, drunk driving, 
suicide, divorce, incarceration and problem gambling treatment. 
Although several studies have attempted to provide monetary estimates of 
the social costs attributable to problem gambling, most of them are seriously 
flawed. Most of these studies generate social cost estimates that are based 
upon arbitrary assumptions.8
COMORBIDITY AND PROBLEM GAMBLING 
Virtually all social cost estimates in the literature are difficult to accept 
because they do not take into consideration that pathological gambling, 
more often than not, occurs simultaneously with other disorders 
(“comorbidity”). This means that individuals who have a gambling problem 
often have other disorders, such as alcohol or drug abuse, or compulsive 
shopping. One study estimated that 73 percent of pathological gamblers 
8  For a full discussion, see chapters 13 and 14 of D.M. Walker (2013). Casinonomics: The Socioeconomic 
Impacts of the Casino Industry. New York: Springer.
also have an alcohol use disorder.9  In addition, the researchers found that 
38.1 percent of problem gamblers have had a drug use disorder at one 
point or another in their lives. Mood disorders affected roughly 50 percent 
of pathological gamblers, 41 percent had anxiety disorders and almost 30 
percent had obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. Other studies find 
similar results.  
Compulsive gamblers, then, are not a cross-section of the American 
population and many suffer from a variety of physical and social ills 
unconnected to gambling. Hence, one cannot attribute all of their problems 
to compulsive gambling.  
PREVALENCE RATE
Approximately 0.5 percent to 2 percent of the general public is thought to 
be afflicted with a gambling disorder. This rate does not seem to vary by 
region or through time. Although there is some evidence that the introduction 
of a new casino may lead to at least a short-term increase in the rate of 
problem gambling, evidence indicates that this rate falls back to around the 
previous rate as time passes.10
Hampton Roads is home to 1.7 million people, so it is safe to assume that 
there are already between 8,500 and 34,000 problem gamblers residing 
in our region. The number might rise somewhat if a casino is introduced, 
but would return to about these levels in the long run, based upon the 
experience of other regions.
CASINOS AND CRIME
As noted earlier, pathological gamblers may engage in criminal activity 
to finance their gambling activities. They also may be more likely to 
file for bankruptcy and get divorced. In addition, they may face higher 
incarceration rates, accumulate debts they cannot pay and be less 
productive in their jobs. Psychologists have studied the problematic 
9  N.M. Petry, F.S. Stinson and B.F. Grant (2005). “Comorbidity of DSM-IV Pathological Gambling and 
Other Psychiatric Disorders: Results from the National Epidemiological Surveys on Alcohol and Related 
Conditions.” Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 66(5), 564-574.
10  This is referred to as an “adaptation effect.” See H.J. Shaffer, R.A. LaBrie and D. LaPlante (2004). 
“Laying the Foundation for Quantifying Regional Exposure to Social Phenomena: Considering the Case of 
Legalized Gambling as a Public Health Toxin.” Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 18, 40-48.
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behaviors associated with gambling, and are continuing research on 
treatment options. The negative impacts of problem gambling clearly are 
worth consideration prior to the introduction of casino gambling into a 
region. 
There have been numerous studies of crime rates before and after the 
introduction of casinos. At least two theories of crime suggest there may 
be a link between casinos and crime. One is the economic theory, which 
suggests that criminals are rational, and that the decision to commit crime 
is based on a comparison between expected costs and benefits. Casinos 
may be a catalyst for criminal behavior because casino patrons are likely 
to carry large amounts of cash. The other major theory, the routine activities 
theory of crime, focuses on three simultaneous conditions – likely offender, 
suitable targets and a lack of enforcement against crime – that create the 
ideal atmosphere for criminal activities. In the view of some, casinos provide 
all three. 
A recent review of the casinos and crime issue examined 16 different 
studies conducted between the mid-1980s until about 2010.11 The markets 
studied included cities such as Atlantic City, Biloxi and Reno; states including 
Colorado, Wisconsin and Indiana; and counties in various states. Among 
the 16 studies reviewed, eight studies found no casinos and crime link, six 
found that casinos unambiguously increased crime and two reported mixed 
results. 
11 Chapter 16 in D.M. Walker (2013). Casinonomics: The Socioeconomic Impacts of the Casino Industry. 
New York: Springer.
Summing It Up
If a riverboat casino were to open, say, on the Elizabeth River in the 
middle of Hampton Roads, it would have only a small economic impact 
on our region. This is because casino expenditures usually reduce other 
expenditures. Only if the casino attracted gamblers from outside Hampton 
Roads, or if it acted as a magnet so that our residents stopped spending 
money outside our region, would there be any economic impact of note.  
The casino would generate additional tax revenues, but once again likely at 
the expense of tax revenues being collected at other businesses throughout 
the region.  
There would be social costs attached to the new casino, though these have 
proven to be difficult to document on a broad scale in other states.  
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